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Introduction  
Recent historical writing about the British Empire suggests that imperial history is 
going through a new period of debate and understanding. This is partly due to 
innovative terms and definitions of conquest and exploitation being used to describe 
the modern world, which has helped historians develop new approaches to 
understanding imperialism. Terms such as ‘neo-colonialism,’ ‘globalisation’ and ‘post-
colonialism’ have all entered into, and shaped, the discourse. Stephen Howe writes 
that, “All these labels tend to come attached to heavy luggage: a great weight of history 
and ideology, sometimes of elaborate theorising, sometimes of raw emotion.” 1 
Moreover, debates about the changing nature of imperialism are also altering. This is 
caused by the dramatic rise of American power in the modern world, defined as having 
a considerable imperial strategy, especially after the terrorist attacks against America 
on September 11, 2001.2        
 In contemporary studies, historians and academics are looking back to 
imperialism in the past to try and help us understand the present. British imperial 
history is, once again, facing revision because of this, with Britain increasingly being 
seen as a post-imperial nation, once viewed as a country where ‘Empire’ was central in 
the formation of a British identity. Moreover, there is gradually more of an emphasis 
placed on the everyday lives of those who were impacted by imperialism.  
 The mid-nineteenth century is a key turning point in British politics with the 
electorate significantly expanded after the first Reform Act of 1832, and Britain’s 
imperial power was ever increasing. Politicians had to find novel ways of ruling the 
people in a democratic age, whilst trying to avoid popular uprisings that had been 
engulfing Europe at the time. By 1867, directly after the Second Reform Act, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 S. Howe, Empire: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2002), p.9. 
2 N. Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London, 2004), p.1-3. 
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electoral franchise was expanded significantly, and this permitted the rising 
aspirational classes to become more engaged in the democratic process. Political 
parties subsequently became the established means for permanent mass mobilisation; 
thus exerting control over forms of popular political expression in a way that appeared 
to be legitimate, and thereby competing to be the reflective image of the nation.3 In 
order to mobilise mass support among the increasing enfranchised classes, there was a 
great desire to ‘domesticate’ Britain’s imperial mission by relating it to the living 
standards of the mass of the British populace. Upon the economic unity of empire, they 
argued, depended on the strength of Britain’s industrial base and the productive power 
of its economy. In turn, this determined employment opportunities, wage levels, job 
security and the possibility of major instalments of social reform such as old-age 
pensions.4 Domesticating empire was not an easy task and it had to involve a narrative 
about Britain’s destiny that could be shared among the wider electorate.  
 The British Empire, undoubtedly, is one of the best examples of imperial power 
in human history. Britain managed to exercise its power and influence over a quarter of 
the world’s people and geographical land mass. It is still uncertain, however, as to how 
exactly Britain managed to impose an imperial ideology on subjects at home, and in 
their dominions, and historians are still at odds as to what extent the empire truly 
affected the people living in Britain. This leads to larger questions: how was Britain 
able to do this? And, what specific ideological concepts allowed them to achieve this?
 Historians such as David Cannadine have tried to uncover this missing 
information, arguing that the British Empire was not always concerned with invasion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 
1867-1914, (Cambridge, 1998) p. 163. 
4 A.S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932, (Harlow, 
2000), p. 53.	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and exploitation as it was in trying to maintain its governance at home and abroad.5 
Bernard Porter argued that the impact and support for empire at home has often been 
exaggerated and constantly shifting.6 Well as Andrew S. Thompson suggests that while 
empire was not always significant in the lives of the British, it still had a huge impact 
on society and political culture.7  What these historians have overlooked, however, is a 
certain ideological concept that allowed empire to have an impact on the lives of the 
British people, and the wider political culture. One of the political ideals that managed 
to manifest itself into British political life with incredible popularity was the idyllic 
concept of the ‘one-nation’ that was invented by Benjamin Disraeli and championed 
with the help of the Conservative party, which he commanded.  
 ‘One-nation’ was the notion of uniting the working poor with the richer elites 
along similar values and interests. It was a simplistic view of politics, but it had a 
profound resonance on both the Conservative and Liberal parties, and even among the 
wider political elite. In order to achieve the ideal of the ‘one-nation,’ political elites 
decided to use a form of nationalism that linked Britain’s imperial mission with British 
patriotism in the domestic political sphere. In essence, ‘one-nation’ became ‘one-
empire’, although the term ‘one-empire’ as such was never used.    
 The concepts of one-nation and one-empire and the way they functioned in 
Britain’s political culture is the topic of this research thesis. These idealistic concepts 
had a profound importance, as they were used as political instruments in order to attain 
and maintain power in British India and in domestic British politics. In short, 
whichever party could present themselves as the patriotic party and reinforce the ideals 
of ‘one-nation’ and the ‘one-empire’ could dominate British political life and shape the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (Oxford, 2001), p. xiv. 
6 See B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain 
(Oxford, 2004) pp. 194-226. 
7	  A.S. Thompson, Imperial Britain, p. 1.	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political culture. Following the logic of conservative ideology, one-empire became a 
sacred tradition that needed protecting, a contract not only between all parts of the 
empire, but also between those who are dead, those who are living, and those who 
were yet to born. Any political party or figure that deviated from this tradition would 
risk being beaten at elections and even considered to be treacherous.8 As will be shown 
in the chapters, the successful employment of this notion was at the heart of the rise of 
conservatism, and the party and those who suffered most from deviating away from 
these concepts were radical Liberals and the Liberal party itself.    
 With this in mind, we need to broaden the debate on British imperial politics by 
stressing the importance of these ideals and their impact. This thesis analyses the rise 
of the concepts of ‘one-nation’ and ‘one-empire’ and asks how they were being used 
and reinforced by political parties and political figures as an instrument to achieve 
popular, democratic and electoral success in the mid to late nineteenth century. Three 
case studies have been selected because together they exemplify, at key moments, 
when the concepts of one-nation and one-empire were implemented to solve particular 
crises in imperial and domestic policy. First of all, in order to understand these 
concepts, it is imperative to look more closely at how they came into being. Secondly, 
it is necessary to analyse how and why politicians, from both Liberal and Conservative 
parties, sought to attach themselves to these concepts, and Britain’s imperial might, in 
order to attain and maintain their power in domestic and imperial British politics. 
Therefore, the question this thesis will attempt to answer will be: How exactly were the 
concepts of one-nation and one-empire used by the British political class, in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A.S. Thompson, ‘The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial 
Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, Twentieth-
Century British Studies (1997), p. 170.	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increase authority and legitimacy in their dominions, and mobilise popular support at 
home in an age of increasing democracy? 
A wide variety of sources will be used to answer this question, which will 
include letters and speeches of notable political figures such as Benjamin Disraeli, 
Lord Salisbury and Joseph Chamberlain. Letters and speeches, although they reveal 
evident biases of political figures, are vital because they reveal a particular political 
language and phrasing that upholds the concepts of one-nation and one-empire, and 
helps us to understand the influence that these conceptions had on the British political 
class when it came to matters both domestic and imperial. Newspapers, party leaflets 
and propaganda posters will also be used as they bare a specific character about the 
ideology of media outlets and political parties, but also, around times of elections they 
expose what the parties and newspapers believed were the main priorities of the 
moment. In the case of the general election in 1886 it is the calamity surrounding Irish 
Home Rule, and in the 1900 general election it is the events surrounding the Boer War 
that dominated party politics and the media. 
The first chapter of this thesis concerns the collapse of liberal imperialism 
following the Mutiny and Revolt of 1857, when a Sepoy regiment of the British army 
broke ranks and mutinied against their colonial rulers. The liberal imperialist vision 
always held that with British guidance and leadership, India could advance towards a 
higher stage of enlightenment. This whiggish narrative was smashed following the 
events of the mutiny, and liberal imperial thought was in disarray. The model that took 
over the mantle of liberal imperialism was a far more conservative outlook that was 
deeply pessimistic of the liberal vision. The rise of ‘one-nation’ with its profound 
impact on British politics subsequently crept its way into imperial affairs in India. In 
imperial terms the British nation and its empire were combined, and this allowed a 
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theme of ‘one-empire’ to enter into the political discourse. In India this was achieved 
by sacralising certain aspects of British imperial institutions, most importantly, the 
Crown. The ceremonial spectacle of the Imperial Assemblage was held in 1877 at 
Delhi, which provided Queen Victoria with the title ‘Empress of India,’ which was 
done in order to achieve ‘one-empire’ under a symbolic sovereign.  
 The second chapter will then concern domestic British politics, and how the 
concept of ‘one-empire’ was used in the debates surrounding the Irish Home Rule 
Crisis of 1885-86. Following the ascension of 86 Irish Nationalist Members of 
Parliament to the House of Commons in 1885, the consensus of the Irish position in the 
union, and the wider imperial sphere began to look astonishingly weak. With the 
governing Liberal party, under the leadership of William Ewart Gladstone, backing 
Irish Home Rule, there was a genuine panic among unionists across all parties that the 
union could dissolve, and severely damage the integrity and legitimacy of the empire. 
Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, in order to fend off the threat and win the general 
election of 1886, resurrected the language of one-nation and one-empire to try and 
defeat the Irish Nationalist onslaught in Parliament.      
 And, finally, the last chapter will chart the coming of the Second Boer War and 
how the same techniques of one-empire were used in order to pursue a conservative 
agenda and hound Liberal and radical voices that decided to speak out against the war, 
or disregard the issue. The use of media in spreading the ideals of British imperialism 
and one-empire conservatism will also be studied, with particular reference to the 1900 
‘khaki’ general election, which was one of the first elections where mass media heavily 
dominated the political culture, and another election where the language of one-empire 
proved to be a winning electoral strategy. 
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Chapter I –The changing nature of Britain’s Imperialist ideology in India: The 
collapse of Liberal Imperialism and the rise of ‘One-Empire Conservatism.’ 
The Battle of Plassey in 1757 established a major victory for the British when the 
English East India Company triumphed over the Nawab of Bengal and his French 
cohorts, and the British gained considerable control over India and the wider 
subcontinent. The historian U.S. Mehta opines that in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Britain and India encounter each other as ‘strangers’. They do not speak the 
same languages, share the same religion, or the norms and values of everyday life.9  
Liberal administrators were placed in a position of supreme intellectual power over 
India and its people. They were not certain, however, as to how they were supposed to 
govern these people.          
 The difficult task facing the British was to attempt to establish how a 
conquering ‘civilised race’ was to turn a foreign collective of ‘uncivilised’ peoples 
towards British ideas of enlightenment.10 For more than a hundred years after 1757 this 
liberal programme of imperialism was based on governance, reform, and on the 
imposition of an educational structure on the lives of the Indian people, enabling them 
to be in a position to participate in a democratic process.     
 The event of the Sepoy Mutiny and the subsequent revolt in 1857, not only 
sparked a crisis in the political system, but a crisis in liberal philosophical thought, 
which caused an insurgence of conservative supremacy in values and governance. The 
values that occurred, as a result of the Liberal imperialism’s reformation, were highly 
pessimistic of human nature and tremendously authoritarian. This chapter concerns the 
decline of Liberal imperialism and the rise of one-nation conservatism as a force in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 U.S. Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago, 1999), p.24. 
10 T.R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge, 1998), p.29.	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Britain and India, and the individual behind this vision, Benjamin Disraeli (1804-
1881), twice Conservative Party Prime Minister and Tory spearhead. It is time to 
broaden the aspects and philosophies of Disraeli’s writings with regards to British 
expansionism and the conservative philosophy so that we can seek to increase our 
understanding about the mentalities and complexities that allowed the British to rule 
India ever more greatly after 1857. 
 Whilst addressing the failures of liberal imperialism, Britain’s imperial 
ideology after the Revolt of 1857 was largely implemented from a conservative 
outlook. Writers such as Karuna Mantena and Thomas Metcalf have argued this 
effectively.11 However, we must be more explicit as to what else transpired as a result. 
The drive of the conservative outlook was met not only by increasing authoritarian 
rule, but also an extension of the one-nation conservative philosophy to include 
Britain’s imperial dominions. In India this was demonstrated through a sacralisation of 
imperial politics, where the crown became a potent, politically religious symbol of 
Britain’s imperial rule. This chapter will observe the complexities of Britain’s 
imperialist ideology in India, by looking closely at key individuals, and how they 
managed to use their own philosophies to bend this ideology to their will.  
            * 
 Britain built its empire on the basis of economic advancement. It provided a 
geographical and economic importance in the centre of Asia. It allowed Britain to 
control the entire Indian Ocean, including crucial sectors of the African coast and its 
surroundings. Furthermore, British exports such as cotton were booming in the 
nineteenth century, and the British balance of payments internationally relied on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 K. Mantena, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism’ Histoire@Politique. Politique, Culture, 
Société, No.11, Mai-Août (2010).  T.R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge, 1998). 
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payment surplus, which India provided.12 Since the origins of the empire, Britain had 
been struggling with the question of how to make sense of, not only the economic 
advancement, but of the ‘different’ and disparate indigenous peoples they were to 
govern. During the eighteenth century, and the greater part of the nineteenth century, 
British politics was dominated by the Liberals, and, therefore, led by their opinions and 
influences. The historian Thomas Metcalf asserts that the Liberals and their wider 
imperial goals were informed by a ‘radical universalism’; the conviction that the entire 
world would benefit from the same values.13 They held the strong belief that the world 
would be more stable and orderly if it was aligned with similar doctrines of liberalism. 
 The leading ideal of liberal imperial thought was termed a ‘civilising 
mission’.14 This ideal of a liberal philosophy, promoted by amongst others James Mill 
(1773-1836), was that the Indian people were simply not in a position, or intelligent 
enough, to determine their own fate. 15 In line with the views of John Locke (1632-
1704), whereby children were not yet political subjects, and non-white colonies were 
consequently placed into this category.16 Mill was a distinguished liberal philosopher 
who made strong arguments for Britain to govern India, along with the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Mill wrote frequently about India and 
addressed the complexities of British rule, and what the obligations of Britain should 
be towards its dominions. Similarly, to his case for Britain ruling Ireland, Mill believed 
that the initial dominance of imperial dominions was regrettable, but it was 
irreversible, and it would be thoroughly immoral to pull out of the dominions, ruining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (London, 1987), p.69. 
13 T.R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p.34. 
14 P.J. Cain, ‘Character, ‘Ordered Liberty’, and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral 
Justification of Empire, 1870-1914’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 
40, No.4 (2012), p.563. 
15 E.P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J.S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’ 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.44, No.4 (1983), p.605.	  
16 A. Sartori, ‘The British Empire and its Liberal Mission’ The Journal of Modern History, 
Vol.78, No.3 (2006), p.1. 
   
	  
12	  
12	  
the lives of the Indians.17 The commitment to replace Indian barbarism for English 
enlightened civilisation was conceived of as a moral duty, but also an apology for the 
depravities of British takeover.18 Therefore, Britain’s duty was to right the previous 
wrongs of their rule, and maintain a level of superiority as a temporary measure while 
India learnt to become a civilised nation.      
 Britain had to ensure order and security to the Indians and prepare them to enter 
eventually into a higher stage of civilisation. The Indians had to be coerced into 
becoming free, autonomous individuals. Mill alleged that India needed to be 
transformed through a straightforward legal, land and educative process. This followed 
principles, outlined by Bentham, which stated that the instrument to make the 
transformation of a savage, barbarous society, was to implement a straightforward set 
of legal codes administered by an effective judiciary. This was a strong 
characterisation of the British imperialist ideology in India. The notion was that Britain 
was the advanced civilisation, while ignoring the previous domination of foreign lands, 
and was doing its duty as civilised peoples by bringing British values, such as the rule 
of law, education, property rights and other British freedoms to feudal and backward 
societies.         
 British officials, consequently, brought liberal legal codes, practices and 
systems into Indian society. Policies such as the Permanent Settlement of Bengal in 
1793, the abolition of Sati (where women commit suicide on their husband’s funeral 
pyre) in 1829, and the suppression of Thuggee (organised gangs) between 1836 and 
1848, were all introduced. These policies had a detrimental outcome on the functioning 
of Indian society and the relationship between Indian people and British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 K.J.M. Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist (Cambridge, 
1988), p.147. 
18 K. Mantena, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism’, p.14.	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administrations.19 The Permanent Settlement tried to establish a legal framework of 
land, the rights of property, and fix the land tax in perpetuity. However, this resulted in 
failure, as the land was sold off to rich merchants who were not interested in the 
maintaining the land, leaving vast stretches of land decimated and open to vast 
corruption.20 Moreover, the abolition and suppression of Sati and Thuggee disturbed 
the complications of cultural customs that had existed in India prior to British rule. By 
condemning cultural acts that had been established long before the British had 
conquered India, the British ironically made these forms of ritual far more valuable to 
the Indian people than before, because the Indians became convinced their customs 
were at risk from outside, unfamiliar forces.21     
 Liberals and utilitarians, like Mill, were insistent that English should also be the 
primary language, declaring ‘Indian Knowledge’ to be completely useless.22 One of the 
most famous and notable aspects of this belief was demonstrated by Thomas 
Babington Macaulay’s ‘Minute on Education’ in 1835, where he stated that English 
was the only language worth knowing. Moreover, the spread of the English language 
would help to create “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in 
tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”23  This was the key message in 
Macaulay’s speech. Macaulay believed it was necessary to create a class of Indian 
administrators, under British influence, that would communicate with the Indians, and 
adapt themselves to British rule. The British avoided converting the Indians to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 W.D. Rubenstein, Britain’s Century: A Political and Social History 1815-1905 (London, 
1998), p.129. 
20 H. R. C. Wright, ‘Some Aspects of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal’, The Economic 
History Review, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1954), p.212 
21 N.B. Dirks, ‘The Policing of Tradition: Colonialism and Anthropology in Southern India’ 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 39, No.1 (1997), p.183. 
22 T. Niranjana, ‘Translation, Colonialism and the Rise of the English’. In Rethinking English: 
Essays in Literature, Language, History ed. S. Joshi (Oxford, 1991), p.140.	  
23 Minute by the Hon'ble T. B. Macaulay, dated the 2nd February 1835. 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_
1835.html 
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Christian religion, but, in actual fact, they converted and indoctrinated the Indians into 
traditional state customs, and legal practices from Britain. This was an issue to do with 
civilising, but also, of exerting influence and prestige.    
 Towards the end of the 1830s the age of Indian reform had come to a close, 
with Bentham and Mill dying by 1836. 24  The liberal imperial ideology of the 
eighteenth century promoted the plain dichotomy of right against wrong, or civilised 
against uncivilised, and allowed the British administrations to believe that the liberal 
imperialist policies were essential in moving the Indian people towards enlightenment 
and progress. It was no longer straightforward, however, to suggest that through radical 
reform a foreign nation would willingly bend to the rule of the British liberals. In fact, 
the Indian people became discontented with British rule. These dogmatic principles 
dominated the liberal conceptions of imperialism in the early to mid-nineteenth 
century. This had a profound effect on administrators and British political conceptions 
of responsibility for foreign territories.      
 On the other hand, this did not deter the liberals from their positions. It would 
be James Mill’s son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a statesman, and a renowned 
proponent of liberal thought, who continued his father’s belief that Britain had the 
responsibility and right to rule over the people of India. John Stuart Mill had his own 
‘philosophy of history’ that underlined his theories of politics and international 
outlooks. He shared with other Enlightenment authors the assumption of cultural 
development for all of humankind and the ranking of existing, as well as extinct, 
societies on a scale of civilisation.25 Mill argued that in order to convert those who 
were uncivilised to a higher form of life and civilisation, the English East India 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), p.239.	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Company had to implement a superior influence over India than it had ever been 
previously, especially more so than had been exercised in Britain itself.26 Mill set out 
his philosophy of history in each of his major writings to some extent. The most 
detailed and systematic exposition, however, we find is in his essay Considerations on 
Representative Government (1861). Mill argued that representative government is the 
best form of government – but like his father’s belief, only for civilised nations. He 
argued in favour of a British Empire composed of white settler colonies and of non-
settler dependencies in Asia, Africa, and Ireland.27 Different colonies were governed in 
different ways depending on the stage of civilisation they had reached, and on the 
political arrangements they had inherited.28  Although, Mill’s arguments provided 
Britain with a notion of its superiority in ruling India, once again, they would not stop 
disastrous events from occurring. The regime that had been dominated by liberal 
imperialism – founded on accepted universal values and aimed at producing an 
‘Anglicised’ India – was undermined by the Indian Revolt of 1857.29 
 During the Indian summer of 1857, a Sepoy rebellion broke out in the 
headquarters of a division of the Bengal army. It was an extremely violent reaction by 
a section of Indian society in retaliation to their British rulers who were set on 
modernising and dramatically changing the social and cultural society around the 
Indian peoples; rumours spread rapidly that the British had greased Enfield rifle 
cartridges with pork and cow fat (the pig being unclean to Muslims and the cow being 
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sacred to Hindus). 30 This angered the Indian soldiers immensely, and eventually acted 
as a facilitator for further revolts, with the army mutiny transforming into a popular 
uprising as peasants, local notables and urban groups, cutting across castes and creeds, 
joined together to fight foreign rule in many northern and central areas of India. The 
rebellion was one of the strongest examples of extreme discontent towards British 
dominance throughout the rule of the Company, and now the British ruling powers 
were left in a considerable crisis of foreign and imperial policy.31  However, one of the 
British figures that remained completely tranquil throughout all of this was Benjamin 
Disraeli.          
 Disraeli was a conservative and an amateur orientalist. He serenely argued that 
the revolt was a direct consequence of weakening the inherent Indian society by 
liberals who were trying to make India an identical copy of Britain, while undermining 
India’s culture and religion. Prior to the Revolt, he criticised the British liberal reforms 
of Dalhousie and the Doctrine of Lapse, which automatically annexed some princely 
states that were already under East India Company control. Disraeli firmly claimed the 
cause of the revolt was not pure discontent with British presence in its entirety, but the 
certain policies, and a liberal dogma the British had been imposing on the Indians.  He 
stood with discontented liberals, conservatives and other orientalists who argued that 
Britain should focus not on reforming India to liberal standards, but on being a 
guarantor of British imperialism and good governance towards the Indian people.32 
This was amplified in Queen Victoria’s ‘Proclamation’ on the 1st November 1858 that 
explicitly renounced ‘the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our 
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subjects’ and ‘deeply lament[ed] the evils and misery which have been brought upon 
India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen, by false 
reports, and led them into open rebellion’. 33  Significantly, Queen Victoria’s 
proclamation provided proof that British imperialism was now becoming tinged with 
the sort of language that would normally be associated with Edmund Burke and other 
conservatives who were sceptical of human behaviour, utopias and the liberal mantra 
of progress. It was the first major sign of a breakaway from the liberal imperialist 
consensus.           
 The events of the Mutiny and its aftermath were to be all-important. The 
immediate response was to bring the paternalist systems of rule in India that focused 
on good governance, not the spread of British liberal systems. This lifted to being 
supported in common British administrations.34 Men like Disraeli were incredibly 
effective manipulators of the public mood and provided a voice for urgent reform and a 
complete rethink of British policy.35 In spite of this, what also emerged in the discourse 
was an alternative, highly pessimistic philosophy that gave the arguments for an 
adjustment in British policy in India. A liberal writer and lawyer would provide this 
philosophy at the time of the Mutiny, James Fitzjames Stephen.   
 Stephen is predominantly known today for being J.S. Mill’s main detractor, and 
promoted a sceptical argument of liberal imperialism. In 1873 Stephen wrote a book 
titled Liberty, Equality, Fraternity that was heavily critical of the doctrines of liberal 
imperialism that he believed had been detrimental in causing wide displeasure in India, 
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and even causing failures in the wider liberal movement.36 Stephen attempted to prove 
that J.S. Mill had perverted the utilitarianism of his father and Bentham by trying to 
bind it into the same frame as popular-style liberalism. He passionately defended the 
pragmatic forms of liberalism, which bore more than a shallow resemblance to the 
political ideas of conservatives. The main motivation behind Stephen’s arguments was 
his undying patriotism. He viewed Britain as a country that was loathed by the highly 
educated elites and popular leaders, especially in liberal cliques.37    
 Along with figures such as Sir Henry Maine, Sir Alfred Lyall and Lord Cromer, 
Stephen stressed the ancient primitiveness of Indian civilisation, and that conquered 
states’ traditions and values had to be preserved. Furthermore, Stephen, and supporters 
around him, opposed the hasty imposition of western values and institutions for fear 
that they would undermine the stability of ‘traditional society’ and supported what 
became known as ‘indirect rule’ through local elites who would be more than happy to 
oblige in assistance.38 For Stephen, defenders of liberal imperialism had confused good 
government with representative government. He soon became an advocate of what can 
be described as ‘authoritarian liberalism,’ that detracted largely from Mill’s 
philosophy, which he described as having ‘too favourable an estimate of human 
nature’.39           
 This harked back to philosophers such as Bentham, but more importantly to 
Thomas Hobbes, and his work Leviathan (1651). Hobbes stressed that if man is left to 
his own devices he will engage in selfishness and greed, epitomised by Hobbes’s 
infamous phrase that life for all would then become “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
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short”.40 Stephen used this ideology to assert that the aim of government was to not 
liberate, but to provide happiness and protect as many individuals as possible.41 This, 
Stephen claimed, was what Britain should provide in India. Some liberals did take 
some of Stephen’s ideas on board, but, with Stephen inciting Hobbes’s arguments for 
authority and protection, they actually inspired the minds of those who wee against the 
whig ideal of a progressive liberal imperialism.     
 Stephen provided liberal imperialism, and the imperialist ideology at large, 
with a truly “British” face, one of patriotism, order and service, rather than greediness 
and self-interest.42  His aim in doing so, was to take liberalism away from the 
damaging, meddling, mawkish and populist movement it had become during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and direct it instead toward the devoted upholding of a 
fine, enduring and distinctively English inheritance. What caused conflict in the liberal 
movement was the distinction between ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and ‘sentimental’ 
liberalism.43           
 By 1886, the Liberal Party eventually split over the issue of Irish Home Rule. 
Yet, even before this split the Liberals were heavily divided on imperial issues. It was 
to be the Conservative Party who would take on the ideas of Stephen and Disraeli. 
Conservative statesmen like Disraeli were angered by the liberal handling of the Revolt 
in 1857, and took their chance to establish strong authoritarian rule, rather than 
constant reforms and pettifogging interruptions in Indian society. These authoritarian 
liberals allied themselves with an increasingly strong Conservative Party who found 
ideas of leadership, hierarchy and tradition as imperative values that promoted 
stability. Authoritarian liberals became an influential part of the British political state 	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and conservative psyche.44        
 The reformation of liberal imperialism dramatically changed the way Britain 
ruled the Empire by halting the age of reform, leaving Indian cultures, religions and 
societies to themselves. The imperial ideology that the liberals had created had not 
collapsed, but merely shifted towards a more authoritarian style of liberal thought 
towards India that focused on conservative values of paternalism and good governance, 
not through reform to push Indians toward enlightenment. The ideological collapse of 
liberal imperialists allowed the conservative strand of imperialism to strike and gain 
supremacy at an opportune moment. The ideas they held later gained an influential 
force, largely due to Benjamin Disraeli and his ideas of one-nation conservatism. 
Disraeli linked his beliefs to India’s role in the British Empire. His new imperial 
paradigm incorporated ideologues of conservatism and nationalism that ultimately 
were far more intrusive into the lives of the Indian people, and created a new 
imperialism in India that would set a new agenda and shift Britain’s imperialist 
ideology. 
             * 
Disraeli gained iconic status in British politics by taking a profoundly moral stance in 
the Conservative Party and the public sphere at large. He was born in 1804 to a Jewish 
family in the upper-middle class of urban London, whereby he became an ambitious 
young man and stayed relatively protected by his family’s wealth. He tried to become 
an eminent writer, but later decided to enter the House of Commons in 1837, 
eventually became Prime Minister in 1868 and led a parliamentary majority by 1874.45 
 Disraeli is remembered primarily for his philosophy of one-nation conservatism 
that has become a dominant association for conservative politicians right up to the 	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present day. It was a philosophy that was deeply strengthened through the political and 
literary novels that he wrote. The novels told simple and sentimental stories, but behind 
them lay Disraeli’s true ideological beliefs, and writing novels was one of many ways 
in which he expressed them.        
 His first major novel Coningsby: Or, the New Generation (1844) centred on the 
events of the 1832 Reform Act where the electorate was substantially increased from 
366,000 to 650,000 in England and Wales,  and Disraeli heavily criticised the large 
force from the Liberal Party and other utilitarians who tried to hold it back.46 It was at 
this time that Disraeli began to loath the cultural strand of nineteenth-century elitism in 
British politics and wished to expose it and turn against it.47 Disraeli was highly active 
in the Westminster establishment, and treated himself as an outsider in the British 
Parliament who knew that his fellow politicians and countrymen were lucky to be born 
into the social lives they were consuming, and utterly ignorant of the troubles of the 
immensely poor labourers in fields and factories that were living in complete squalor.48 
 His most celebrated work Sybil (1845) was an exposé of the conditions the poor 
in Britain. Disraeli told a story about a heroine, who is a simple version of Cinderella, 
and her connection with the hero ‘Egremont’ – first disguised as an commonplace 
member of the population – as the princely figure, but it was a merely a cover for 
Disraeli to promote his ideological propaganda. Disraeli’s novels are, in Blake’s 
words, “essentially the product of an extrovert, splendid novels… they deal with the 
problems, if not always with real people, and their vitality is attested by the fact that so 	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many of their expressions have passed into the very language of politics”.49 His works 
had a considerable influence in the British political sphere, precisely because he was 
able to worm his way into it and adapt it in whatever way he pleased.50 The sub-title of 
the novel was The Two Nations, these nations, Disraeli asserted, existed in the same 
geographical entity of Britain, being both the rich and the poor:  
 
“Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are 
as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were 
dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed 
by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different 
manners, and are not governed by the same laws”.51 
 
This idea of the two nations presented a powerful message to the elites of the British 
nation. Britain was immensely divided by wealth, a large amount of which was 
controlled by the elite who had become so distant, who had to be made aware of their 
social duties and moral responsibilities. If they did not address this problem, it would 
lead to revolution. This was a dangerous possibility, especially after the publication of 
The Communist Manifesto a few years later in 1848, and British establishment believed 
the working classes could have turned towards socialism.     
 Disraeli believed that the only solution to this problem was to evoke the ideal 
of one-nation whereby the rich, the poor, and all other social classes highlighted their 
similarities to become loyal subjects to the Crown, bring liberty to the individual, 
heighten the influence of the Anglican Church, to which Disraeli was a convert, and 
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offset revolutionary politics.52 All of this released the unconscious patriotism, which 
had been neglected by the British establishment for many years previously, and closed 
the social and cultural gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Disraeli soon linked 
this powerful mind-set of ‘One Nation’ to the Middle East, India and British 
imperialism. This came as a result of the Indian Revolt of 1857.   
 1857 was the year that the British began to mobilise and entrench authority and 
rule in India. It started officially with the Government of India Bill of 1858 that took 
power away from the English East India Company and allowed the British Crown to 
rule India indefinitely. In actual fact, it became a symbolic gesture, as Queen Victoria 
was the main figure behind the bill, with her Proclamation of 1858, declaring that 
Britain would no longer ‘impose’ its values onto Indian society.53 And it was Disraeli 
who monopolised on this development with beliefs he already recorded a decade 
previously in another of his political novels, Tancred.   
 Tancred, known by its other title, The New Crusade was published in 1847, two 
years after Sybil. Its central plot revolved around a title character that voyages through 
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt, representing an imaginary exportation of 
romance and innovation to the Middle East. It divulged Disraeli’s preoccupation with 
the spiritual, moral, and even racial renaissance of the nation through propagating the 
new conservatism in the British imperial sphere that Disraeli had brought to the 
political discourse.54 In Tancred, the meaning of the Asian mystery placed political and 
social restructuring around momentous philosophies, and was founded by merging the 
West and the East. Disraeli fundamentally urged the western world to seek its salvation 
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and new enlightenment in the eastern world.55     
 Tancred is known now for being a particularly tiresome novel – Morris Speare 
called it “bizarre and incoherent and inorganic” – hence why it is not one of Disraeli’s 
more eminent pieces of work and largely overlooked.56 Tancred’s silver-spoon style 
bildungsroman dissolves into a spiritual myth of Sisyphus where each new escapade 
puts Tancred back to the beginning.57  During the novel, Tancred comes across 
‘Fakredeen’, an Emir of Lebanon, who explains to Tancred the importance of merging 
British symbolic power with the East: 
 
…quit a petty and exhausted position for a vast and prolific empire. Let the 
Queen of the English collect a great fleet, let her stow away her treasure, 
bullion, gold plate, and precious arms; be accompanied by all her court and 
chief people, and transfer the seat of her empire from London to Delhi. There 
she will find an immense empire ready-made, a first-rate army, and a large 
revenue… We will acknowledge the Empress of India as our suzerain, and 
secure for her the Levantine coast… Your Queen is young; she has an avenir. 
Aberdeen and Sir Peel will never give her this advice; their habits are formed. 
They are too old, too rusés. But you seal the greatest empire that ever existed; 
besides which she gets rid of the embarrassment of her Chambers! And quite 
practicable; for the only difficult part, the conquest of India, which baffled 
Alexander, is all done!58 
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The passage even mentions using the power of the Crown to create a better land and 
society:  
 
There is a combination which would entirely change the whole face of the 
world, and bring back empire to the East. Though you are not the brother of the 
Queen of the English, you are nevertheless a great English prince, and the 
Queen will listen to what you say; especially if you talk to her as you talk to 
me, and say such fine things in such a beautiful voice. Nobody ever opened my 
mind like you. You will magnetize the Queen as you have magnetized me. Go 
back to England and arrange this.59 
 
By observing those passages in Tancred, we can see signs that it was Disraeli’s 
ambition to make India the centre of British imperial might, with the sovereign being 
the essential symbolic tool of this profound authority. The ‘English prince,’ that is 
mentioned, is possibly Disraeli, perhaps seeing himself as the political royalty that can 
easily convince the Queen to carry out the desired scheme for India. Disraeli was 
famed for having a substantial flattery toward many distinguished ladies, none more so 
than Queen Victoria, whom he gave the most joyful adulation, treating her with 
courtesy and his charm.60 Disraeli led Victoria to believe that she was entering a role of 
triumphant direction, and Victoria herself believed this, but, in reality, he was using the 
monarchy as a theatrical emblem to bring India under the authority of British rule 
through similar principles of one-nation conservatism, not as a form of serious political 
leadership.61           
 We can grasp an indication of his desire to enact his passages in Tancred when 	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he wrote a toadying letter to Queen Victoria in 1858, telling her that she had a new role 
to play in Britain’s majestic approach to India: 
 
“Yr Majesty would do well to deign to consider the steps, wh: are now 
necessary to influence the opinions, & affect the imagination, of/the Indian 
populations. The name of Yr Majesty ought to be impressed upon their native 
life. Royal proclamations, courts of Appeal in their own land, & other 
institutions [,] forms & ceremonies, will tend to this great result”.62   
 
This ‘great result’ that Disraeli referred to was the implementation of Queen Victoria, 
as the ultimate symbol of British imperialism that he hoped would unite the Indian 
people under the rule of the British. What Disraeli instigated was profound. He grasped 
his concepts of one-nation conservatism he had used on Britain’s working poor and 
moulded them into an Indian society under entrenched British rule. The philosophy of 
‘one-nation’ extended to mean ‘one-empire’, although, Disraeli never officially used 
the term one-empire.  
British imperialists, inspired by Disraeli, looked to a future in which the masses 
in Britain would join with Queen Victoria and her subjects overseas to further the 
cause of Empire. Disraeli, and his followers, or ‘Disraelians,’ encouraged a populist 
monarchism in Britain and India that limited the influence of middle-class liberal 
universalism that was deemed ‘sentimental’, and stifled the possibilities of working-
class socialism and further revolts. They saw the masses in Britain, India and other 
dependencies in parallel positions. Both were in need of paternal direction; they lacked 
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the character to ensure ‘ordered liberty’ whether through paternalist forms of 
nationalism, or spiritual fervour as in India, or because of dangerous visions of 
socialism and revolutions. By becoming one-empire, Disraeli’s philosophies were 
cultivating a powerful imperial ideology of order and control. In the eyes of 
conservative imperialists and authoritarian liberals, the Indians would never be able to 
ascertain full enlightenment.63       
 Disraeli finally obtained power in 1874, and did not set his sights on India 
immediately. He authorised campaigns in Afghanistan and South Africa first, before 
turning his attention to India, to turn it from colonial self-government to the empire. He 
entrusted the help of Lord Robert Bulwer-Lytton, the Viceroy of India from 1876 to 
1880. He wrote to Lytton in 1876 explaining the necessity of his imperial vision, using 
the language of one-nation conservatism as a means to entice all Indian races under 
British control: 
 
If England is to remain supreme, she must be able to appeal to the coloured 
against the white, as well as to the white against the coloured. It is therefore 
not merely as a matter of sentiment and of justice, but as a matter of safety, 
that we ought to try and lay the foundations of some feeling on the part of the 
coloured races towards the crown other than the recollection of defeat and the 
sensation of subjection.64  
 
Well as one-nation conservatism was concerned with uniting different classes in 
Britain, one-empire conservatism seemed to be concerned with race. We can see this 
from Lytton’s statement in his memorandum. Lytton clearly saw it as vital in order to 	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unite the coloured and white races under the symbolic influence of the crown. 
Moreover, Lytton took Disraeli’s advice, while Disraeli pushed through the Royal 
Titles Act of 1876 declaring Queen Victoria as the ‘Empress of India’. On the 11th of 
May 1876, Lytton followed suit, and issued a memorandum announcing his intention 
to hold an ‘Imperial Assemblage’ in Delhi on the 1st of January 1877 to commemorate 
Queen Victoria’s new title. Delhi was to become the ‘seat of her [Queen Victoria’s] 
empire’, just as Disraeli had described in Tancred. Lytton indicated that the ceremony 
would allow the transfer of the administration of India to the Crown:  
 
In openly recognizing and adopting the Imperial title by which She is already 
popularly known to Her Indian subjects, the Queen identifies Her Crown, so 
far as regards this portion of Her Majesty’s dominions, with its special duties 
and interests as the symbol not of an alien, but of a national sovereignty. 65  
 
Here, Lytton demonstrated the one-empire conservative view of India that the British 
state held consistently for over a century, that Britain was not an alien part of India, but 
an integral part of the British nation, and vice-versa. Furthermore, it made the Monarch 
a vital symbol of this connection between the two countries that united them far greater 
than before. This was solely an expression of Benjamin Disraeli’s beliefs, visualised in 
Tancred that were implemented in British imperial policy in India through symbolism 
and ceremony.          
 The Assemblage of 1877 was a grand ceremony in Delhi filled with crowds of 
British officials and a procession of elephants to celebrate the Monarch’s new role as 
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Empress of India. The Queen-Empress herself did not even attend.66 Many British 
newspapers initially loathed the event at the time. They thoroughly disapproved of 
using the term ‘Empress’ to describe the Monarch, since it had been highly associated 
with the negativity of the chauvinistic empires of the past, with Napoleon Bonaparte 
being the strongest example. The Times commented on the: 
 
inexpediency of giving to the sovereign in India a different title from that 
which she bore in England and on the danger of associating the Queen in the 
minds of the Indian people with the fierce conquerors who were Emperors of 
Delhi, or with the wretches who were the Roman Emperors.67   
       
The historian Alan Trevithick has pointed out that most Indians, and to be more exact 
most Hindus, simply did not care about this grand ceremony, and ‘are rather indifferent 
to worldly titles and distinctions, having been taught by their Shastras to encourage 
highly values more spiritual’. They would have found the whole event wholly peculiar 
and a complete waste of time, but to indulge in such an affair would also be 
sacrilegious to their original faith.68 Even the painter of the event Val Prinsep wrote of 
the preparations for the Assemblage with distaste, “They have been heaping ornament 
on ornament, colour on colour… The size… gives it a vast appearance, like a gigantic 
circus.”69 B.S. Cohn stated that many historians had previously dismissed the Imperial 
Assemblage as nothing more than a ‘tamasha’ or a costly event of grand pompery, 
although Cohn was absolutely right to suggest that it had far more practical 
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consequences than are not immediately obvious.70 It was largely to fulfil the essences 
and the philosophies of Disraeli and one-empire conservatism, which allowed the 
British to show the Indians their power and supremacy, but, crucially, it sacralised 
Britain’s rule in India by placing the Monarch as the upmost symbol of authority, and 
using the grand ceremonial aspects of the Assemblage in an attempt to demonstrate 
this.           
 The Assemblage ceremony led the British administrators to believe their own 
myths that India was an integral part of Britain and its Empire, and that they were the 
people destined to rule India. Lytton in his memorandum genuinely believed this: 
“When the administration of India was transferred from the company to the Crown, it 
had virtually come into possession of a suzerain power previously exercised by the 
Moghul Emperors”.71 Not only did Lytton believe that the British were the direct 
inheritors of the Mughal Empire, he firmly believed in the power of ritual being 
uniquely appealing to ‘the native mind’, and being part of the same values that the 
working poor in Britain also held with the Monarchy. This attitude fundamentally 
altered the shape of Britain’s imperialist ideology in India. The British administrators 
viewed its invasion and rule of India as a matter of historical circumstance and 
progress. One-empire conservatism became the supreme force for maintaining 
Britain’s ideological rule in India.       
 The implementation of the Royal Titles Act and the Imperial Assemblage were 
gestures that were an attempt to link the peoples of India under the symbolic authority 
of British rule. This was a concept that traced back to theories used on the working 
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poor in Britain with one-nation conservatism, as outlined by the key figure Benjamin 
Disraeli. Following the collapse of the liberal imperial movement, one-nation theories 
were applied in India to further a notion of one-empire. This was a fundamental aspect 
of the shift in the imperialist ideology that Britain imposed on India toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, in order to control the Indian people. The British conservative 
administrators having adapted the concept of one-nation to mean one-empire in India 
would then seek to use this method to entrench their rule in Britain, and place a greater 
focus on one-empire conservatism as an electoral tool to gain the support of the British 
people. 
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Chapter II: ‘The Unity of Empire’: The resurgence of the ‘One-Nation’ and ‘One-
Empire’ during the Irish Home Rule Crisis, 1885-1886 
Ireland had been a member of the Union since 1801, following on from the wreckage 
of the 1798 rebellion, which was a concerted attempt, inspired by the revolutionary 
upheavals of France and the United States of America, to stave off British rule in 
Ireland altogether. It had opened up an increase in sectarianism with divisions of faith 
and race gapingly present, especially between Catholics and Protestants.72 Ireland was 
unified into British territory completely, although this managed to put off rebellions of 
the sort seen in 1798, Ireland still had a substantial population with certain hostilities 
towards British rule, especially since Ireland had a large number of Catholics in the 
country, yet this had no major affect against British dominance. 
During the 1840s a horrific famine took place in Ireland, caused by Phytophthora 
infestans, a fungus disease that emaciated potato crops throughout most of 
Europe during the 1840s. The Irish people were highly dependent on potato farming, 
and, therefore, the social impact of the Great Famine was seen instantly: the Irish 
population fell by approximately 20% between 1841 and 1851. Labour was highly over 
supplied, particularly in agriculture, which imitated in low salaries, high levels of 
unemployment and dismal housing. The Great Famine in Ireland radically changed 
conditions in the Labour market, altering the scale and composition of demand for 
commodities and services, and affecting production patterns in the long run. 
Unusually, for such a disorderly force, it helped attract isolated local communities into 
a national mainstream.73 Furthermore, the famine left hatred behind, as Britain had 
failed to find a solution in enough time to save lives. Between Ireland and England, the 
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memory of what occurred has continued to dominate Irish history and culture right 
through to the present day. The impact on Irish popular politics in the short years 
following the famine was not radicalisation or resistance, but submission and despair. 
 In 1848, when revolutions were transpiring across the European continent, the 
Great Famine was merely a feeble argument for national self-government, since no 
Irish administration, however sympathetic, could have handled the crisis unaided. 
However, Irish nationalist movements gained heavy ground by the 1880s in 
Westminster politics, with the famine being frequently incited as an argument for 
agitation, and a looser relationship with Britain.74 Yet the famine was not to be the 
major turning point for many of the Irish people to place their faith with Irish 
nationalism. For the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, parliamentary 
politics had been dominated in Ireland, as in Britain, by the landed interest.75  
 Lands in Ireland were organised much the same way as the rest of Britain but 
they faced one major handicap, which was that Irish landlords had tenants on their land 
with a different religious and cultural background, which became incredibly significant 
in political terms. Unlike England – where there existed a sense in which landlord and 
tenant were of similar stock and all part of a common heritage – Irish landlords saw 
themselves as inherently Irish, but tenants often perceived them as foreign usurpers, 
culturally and religiously alien, and having no moral rights to the land they held. 
Moreover, the landlords lived in high levels of extravagance and were often in chronic 
levels of debt. This considerably affected the image of the Irish landlords who were no 
longer seen as being able to uphold levels of moral decency and a reflection of the Irish 
people, despite the landlords claiming they were. Once tenants became much more 
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politicised during the 1880s, nationalist politicians were keen to highlight, and even 
exaggerate, this perception of the alien landlord as the manifestation of English rule in 
Ireland. This provided Irish nationalists with a high amount of power and leverage in 
Irish, and ultimately, British political affairs.76      
 By the general election of 1874, the Irish nationalists, under the stewardship of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party – born out of the Home Rule League, led by Isaac Butt – 
won a staggering 60 seats in the House of Commons. The number of Home Rule Party 
seats increased steadily over the years. By 1880, under William Shaw the number of 
seats had increased to 63. Under the leadership of the charismatic Charles Stewart 
Parnell, the number of seats rose exponentially to 86 five years later. It became clear to 
the main political parties at Westminster, both Liberal and Conservative, that the same 
political consensus on Ireland was no longer viable.77  
There was a genuine risk of a major constitutional crisis. Benjamin Disraeli even 
felt the need to write an urgent letter to the Duke of Marlborough in 1880 calling the 
Irish nationalist success:  
 
a danger, in its ultimate results scarcely less disastrous than pestilence and 
famine, and which now engages your Excellency’s anxious attention, [which] 
distracts that country. A portion of its population is attempting to sever the 
constitutional tie which unites it to Great Britain in the bond which has 
favoured the power and prosperity of both.”78  
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It seemed there was a genuine national and constitutional crisis, not necessarily in 
society, but in the regime itself. Would the separation of Ireland destroy the Union? 
Would it even go as far as undermining the empire? Contemplating these questions 
terrified politicians in both the Conservative and Liberal parties.79   
 Moving on from the impact of one-nation and one-empire conservatism in 
India, it is important to turn now to Britain itself, and its union with Ireland, 
surrounding the events of the Home Rule Crisis. Having implemented the concepts of 
one-nation and one-empire in India, British political elites decided to reinforce these 
ideals in order to deal with the danger of Irish succession. Following disastrous 
incompetence and neglect from the British and their policies in Ireland, nationalist 
politics that had been occurring for a long period, began to gain political legitimacy in 
the British Parliament. In reaction to the events, the British establishment began to 
recoil, and realised that by giving Ireland concessions it could lead to the break up of 
the Union, or even worse, the empire itself. Following this, unionist Liberals and 
Conservatives began to place one-nation and one-empire conservatism at the centre of 
their campaigning and propaganda, predominantly around the debates about the second 
Home Rule Bill, and the general election of 1886.      
 The late Victorian era went through an enlargement of Britain’s prospects, and 
also, perhaps, a sense of British national identity. In this period the shift of attitudes of 
British politicians became part of a new imperial viewpoint. A sort of ‘Britannic 
nationalism’ underpinned the commitment of all the territories of Britain’s vast 
empire.80 In effect, Britain’s imperial role became a sacred aspect of British politics, 
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Britain’s relationship with Ireland was demonised, and considered a traitor to the 
nation and the empire. For Ireland was not only a member of the union with Britain, 
but was also seen by many of Britain’s political elite to be a part of the empire as well. 
To argue in favour of Irish Home Rule, thereby granting Ireland greater autonomy was 
seen not only as an act of great risk, but also one of blasphemy against the British 
Empire and its role in the world. In this chapter we will see that the British reinforced 
the concepts of one-nation and one-empire, and adapted them to British politics as a 
way of dealing with the problems of Irish Home Rule. Moreover, the concepts of the 
‘one-nation’ and ‘one-empire’ were so strong that the Liberal party who were in favour 
of Home Rule were left completely divided over the issue, which eventually split the 
party, consigning the Liberal party to a woeful defeat at the 1886 general election. 
     * 
The first party to tackle the issues and developments earnestly were the Liberals. They 
were more than aware that Ireland posed a serious challenge to British governance, and 
that a formula had to be found which satisfied Parnell’s nationalist followers, and at the 
same time, avoid a complete separation, and an impression that a separation could occur 
in future.81 The strongest advocate for reform was the radical Liberal politician Joseph 
Chamberlain (1836-1914).  
Chamberlain came from a successful, hard working, and well educated 
background. He started off as a screw manufacturer and businessman before becoming 
the famed Mayor of Birmingham. He rose to prominence through the grassroots of the 
Liberal Party, and held considerably negative views towards the aristocracy. The Tory 
party and the Conservative press did all they could to disparage and deride Chamberlain. 
Lord Salisbury likened him to a ‘Sicilian bandit’, and other publications would refer to 
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him as ‘Radical Joe’, even going so far as to call him a communist, and even an 
anarchist, someone who would enthusiastically abolish British society to expand his own 
aspirations.82 Yet, these descriptions of Chamberlain as a Machiavellian chancer can be 
highly misleading. If anything Chamberlain proved to be heavily ideological and 
devoted with his staunch patriotic support for British unionism and imperialism. 
Chamberlain gave his voice to a National Councils scheme outlined in The 
Radical Programme (1885), a text written on behalf of radical Liberals, which 
Chamberlain gave his backing to in the text’s foreword. The Radical Programme 
stipulated a set of proposals in order to offset the political unrest in Ireland: 
 
Nor can it be too strongly insisted on that the supervision and control now 
exercised by the central authority in London involves, not only delay and 
difficulty in the transaction of Imperial business, but an amount of irritation and 
friction which is altogether superfluous…“Palpable as are the evils arising from 
undue interference by the central authority with local government in England, 
we find them intensified when we come to deal with the question of local 
government in Scotland, and still more so in the case of Ireland… There the 
interference is not merely that of a superior or an official, it is moreover the 
interference of an alien authority.83  
 
Chamberlain and the radical Liberals evidently recognised early on that the British 
government was presenting itself unintentionally as an alien authority in the smaller 
nations of the union. It appeared that the consensus on the radical wing of the Liberal 
Party was that it was the lack of an answer to the “Irish Question” that would cause 
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larger levels of division and threaten the Union and the British Empire itself. As The 
Radical Programme goes on to add:  
 
Let it be always remembered that an alienated Ireland means a weakened 
England, and even a weakened Empire… Is an Ireland estranged from 
England to be accepted as the unavoidable and unremovable cause of the 
weakening, in the manner already described, of the British Empire?84  
       
The radical Liberals, led by Chamberlain, were trying to adapt the ideology of the one-
nation, and even one-empire inspired by their Conservative counterparts, in order to 
promote a new policy of radical devolution within the Union itself, to protect the bonds 
of British unity, and prevent the mass break up of Britain’s Empire. By unleashing a 
new form of devolution through a national councils scheme it could re-invent the ideas 
of British nationhood to suit a Liberal agenda. What Chamberlain failed to account for, 
however, was that his leader William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898) wanted to go much 
further than Chamberlain was willing to, and in 1885, before the election of that year, 
promised to move towards granting Ireland Home Rule, and by February the following 
year had become Prime Minister with the help of Parnell’s nationalists, preventing 
Tory agitation in the House of Commons.      
 Gladstone had converted to the same cause as the Irish nationalists precisely to 
try and reach a compromise and move the Liberal Party in a different direction. The 
main setback with Gladstone’s argument, however, was that Irish nationalism, an 
expression of populist romantic idealism, was inconsistent with the traditional 
programme of the Liberal party. Home Rule, for the unionist Liberals, threatened 
Britain’s national power and imperial harmony, and they justified their association 	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with the Conservatives as the formation of a national bloc to protect the national 
interest. Gladstone’s Government, for these Liberals, had departed from the traditional 
conventions of the Liberal Party. The unionist Liberals stood distinctly in a tradition of 
their own, a tradition of resistance to divisive nationalist impulses.85 These sentiments 
were certainly revealed by Chamberlain at the Cobden Club dinner on June 11 1885:  
 
I believe that in the successful accomplishment of its solution lies the only 
hope of the pacification of Ireland and of the maintenance of the strength and 
integrity of the Empire – which are in danger, which are gravely 
compromised…86 
 
There were clearly not only worried rumblings about what Irish Home Rule would 
mean for Britain and its empire, but also what it would mean for Ireland itself. Ireland 
was deeply divided over the issue, especially on Catholic and Protestant lines, as 
Protestants were more likely to favour maintaining the Union of Britain and Ireland. 
There was a fear that Home Rule could have increased hostilities within Ireland. This 
was exemplified by the Liberal imperialist Lord Rosebury, the Foreign Secretary, who 
supported the principle of Home Rule reluctantly, insisting that Ulster’s position 
required careful consideration in order not to cause any post-resolution conflicts.87 
Chamberlain, himself, was unwilling to move on his ideas for a National Councils 
scheme. It was his version of radical devolution, and nothing more. Chamberlain also 
became furious with Gladstone for keeping him in the dark about his intentions and 
policies towards the matter. Gladstone even went as far as shutting Chamberlain out of 
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the debates and negotiations between the Irish leadership and Gladstone.88  
 By the early months of 1886, it looked increasingly inevitable that Chamberlain 
would rebel against Gladstone, not just for shutting him out of major discussions, but 
also for his willingness to risk sacrificing the Union and Britain’s Empire all for the 
sake of the Irish Nationalists.  On 8 March, Chamberlain seemed assured about what 
his response to Gladstone would be, and told his brother Arthur Chamberlain resolutely 
that “As regards Ireland I have quite made up my mind – indeed I have never felt the 
slightest hesitation. If Mr. G’s scheme goes too far, as I expect it will, I shall leave 
him.”89 Chamberlain then wrote to J.T. Bunce:  
 
It is certain that any scheme of the kind attributed to Mr. Gladstone will lead 
in the long run to the absolute national independence of Ireland, and that this 
cannot be conceded without serious danger and the heaviest sacrifices on the 
part of Great Britain. This country would sink to the rank of a third rate 
power, and its foreign policy, already sufficiently embarrassing and absorbing, 
would be complicated by perpetual reference to the state of feeling in 
Ireland.90      
 
Chamberlain fears reflect the feeling that the nation and its empire was sacrosanct, any 
attempt to make concessions was plainly too dangerous to contemplate. Chamberlain 
felt that he had no choice left, and on 15 March, resigned from the government. 
Chamberlain was viewed as being nothing more than a cynical opportunist, although it 
is hard to see it this way. Chamberlain would have certainly been all too aware that his 
resignation came at an enormous personal cost, for it dashed his hopes of becoming 	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leader of the Liberal Party, and a future Prime Minister. Thus, it was vital to build a 
new reputation as a champion against Home Rule rather than a Prime Ministerial 
candidate.91           
 A week later he was in meetings with his Tory rivals Arthur Balfour and Albert 
Grey to discuss future actions, revealing how distant he had become from Gladstone’s 
Liberal movement. Balfour persuaded Chamberlain, that his role as a ‘moderate 
Liberal’ was a crucial bridge in uniting factions of dissident unionist Liberals against 
Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill.92 When the Home Rule Bill was announced on 8 April, 
Chamberlain arose in the House of Commons chamber to raise major concerns and 
outline the Radical Unionists’ objectives to maintain the union and the empire. The 
Liberals that sided with Gladstone were too far to go back and stood firm behind their 
decision. This was seen in addresses made in the Liberal Party Associations across the 
country. One such example was seen in Colchester made by lawyer W. Willis:  
 
Gentlemen, for my part I am glad that Mr. Gladstone refused to begin his 
reign as Prime Minister for the third time, with measures of coercion – (loud 
cheers) – and that he set to work to propound a scheme by which people may 
live in order in Ireland, and not affect injuriously the happiness and comfort of 
any other portion of the Queen’s Dominions. (Renewed Cheers).93   
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Willis’s speech reflects the attitude that Gladstone and his followers decided to take, 
which was a pragmatic, but stubborn way of dealing with the Irish question. It was a 
highly risky move, as he was beginning to alienate large numbers in his own party, and 
even the imperial symbol, the Monarch, for risking the traditional bonds of the nation 
and its imperial strength. Queen Victoria was far from impressed by the developments 
to grant Ireland Home Rule. She was a firm believer in the Union and Empire, and 
thoroughly disliked Gladstone and Chamberlain, and wrote to leading Unionist Liberal 
Lord Hartington on 11 April regarding the crisis: 
 
As this is no party question, but one which concerns the safety, honour, and 
welfare of her dominions, the Queen wishes to express personally to Lord 
Hartington, not only her admiration of his speech on Friday night, but also to 
thank him for it. It shows that patriotism and loyalty go, as they always 
should, before party. And she trusts, with certainty now, that these dangerous 
and ill-judged measures for unhappy Ireland will be defeated.94   
 
The interference of the Queen, a key figure of the nation and the empire, presented a 
wider consensus that confirmed the opinions of unionist Liberals and Conservatives. It 
proved that it was only a matter of months before the government under Gladstone 
would be seriously challenged. The moment came on 8 June, when 94 Liberals voted 
with the Conservatives against the second reading of the Government of Ireland Bill. 
The final count was 311 in favour and 341 against.95 The Unionist Liberals had 
dissented from the Gladstonian side of the party, but the tensions between the two 
groups of the party were already so high, with regards to revolts that occurred on 	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questions of Irish policy, foreign and imperial policy, defence, land reform, radical 
initiatives directed against the House of Lords, and other institutions of privilege. 
Some of these disagreements cut deep into the Liberal party, sufficiently deep for some 
of these radical rebellions. Yet it was the issue of Home Rule that was more likely to 
be the tipping point for the unionist Liberals.96     
 The Liberal infighting and eventual split reflected a mood in British politics, 
not one where sorts of radical politics were rejected, but one in which the models of 
one-nation and one-empire, idealised by Disraeli, were considered too sacred to 
change. It is this factor most of all, other than policies and personalities that caused a 
split among the Liberals and a crisis in parliamentary politics. The ones who would 
benefit from the split were the Tories, who had made their stance on the matter of the 
‘Irish Question’ clear from the outset, and were able to take complete advantage of 
Liberal infighting, and lead with ideas that they had invented previously.  
      * 
The reconstruction of Conservatism in the late Victorian periods was a two-way 
process. The Conservative party steadily shifted its support base from the land to 
property in all its forms, making room for the new middle classes who had slowly risen 
up with their new forms of wealth created by the Industrial Revolution.   
 Following the death of Benjamin Disraeli in 1881, the Conservatives lost one of 
their greatest leaders and a key ideologue. They decided to continue to invoke his ideal 
of the one-nation and empire as being inextricably linked. To the average Tory it 
became clear that economic forces should be made to accommodate themselves to the 
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established model of preserving Disraeli’s ideals.97 It is for this reason that Toryism 
was thoroughly anti-Liberal, as the Liberals were concerned with the notion that 
Britain was in a continuous progression to a higher stage of political thinking, which 
often went against the social customs of conservative minded Britons. Often popular 
Toryism played the politics of patriotism and jingoism, evoking protestant and anti-
Irish feelings.98  
The combined effect of the 1884 Franchise Act and the Redistribution of Seats 
Act of 1885 was to alter both the proportion of county and borough seats in parliament, 
and the levels of electoral participation, following the growth of the middle class 
between 1850 and 1880, by around 300 per cent.99 This allowed a growth of a middle 
class electorate with socially conservative views, who were more likely to prioritise 
what they perceived as traditional and national values.     
 The Conservative party had already, years before, strengthened the ideals of 
one-nation and one-empire under Disraeli, and established themselves as the party of 
the empire. The ensuing Irish Question and Home Rule issue provided them with 
ample opportunity to reinforce this.100 The chief artisan of this new movement would 
be Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquis of Salisbury (1830-1903) who led the party 
after Disraeli’s death. Salisbury had descended from a strong line of landed gentry and 
was the epitome of hard-line British Toryism. He was exceedingly suspicious of 
democracy, liberalism, rapid change, and longed for what he saw as the stability of the 
past. Most of all, he was an unwavering defender of the British nation and its imperial 	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might. Unlike Disraeli, however, he saw no mystique in the Eastern world. Salisbury 
saw imperialism, chiefly as an expression of British power, one of destiny, and 
hierarchical dominance over other races, and would do whatever it took to defend it.101 
 Under the leadership of Salisbury the Conservative arguments, in the debates 
surrounding Home Rule were exceedingly clear: there was to be no suitable settlement 
between Union and full independence for Ireland. Moreover, Salisbury had a terrible 
impression that if Ireland were granted Home Rule the majority of Irish people being 
Catholics would ‘govern the minority [Protestants] in a way utterly inconsistent with 
its rights, and in a manner utterly fatal to all its industrial and commercial hopes.’102 
Here we see a perfect example of Salisbury’s fear of democracy, and what giving the 
people greater power could mean. However, it also reflected a wider problem, that the 
interests of the empire, the interests of Irish independence, and Irish Home Rule were 
an incompatible and combustible mix. It was a political stance in which Salisbury and 
his parliamentary colleagues on the front benches were not ashamed to admit 
publicly.103 
Following the electoral defeat of the Tories in 1885, Salisbury had trouble 
piecing together a proposal on which his party could contest. At Newport in 1885, 
following Gladstone’s conversion, Salisbury avowed that ‘to maintain the integrity of 
the Empire must undoubtedly be our first policy with respect to Ireland’.104 Behind that 
official declaration of policy laid an informal, but deeply rooted doctrine. Home Rule, 
in turn, as Salisbury famously pointed out, risked the disintegration of Empire. As he 
put it at the inauguration of the National Conservative Club, it was not a question of 	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one party or the other, nor was it was a question of the careers of statesmen. It was a 
question of being engaged in a struggle on the issue of ‘whether our existence as a 
great empire is to continue or not’.105 
He decided, therefore, to retreat to a recipe, which had often served the party 
well in the past – the idea that the Protestant traditions of Britain were in danger from 
Liberal and Irish reformers. Salisbury evoked a phrase that was becoming popular at 
the time: ‘Home Rule is Rome Rule’. Declaring that ‘the worst government in the 
world is the government by priests’.106 This was a direct implication that Britain should 
certainly never be dictated to by alien outsiders who had interests in serving 
unfamiliar, revolutionary forces, in this case, the Papacy. Ironically, this was the exact 
same line of argument the Irish Nationalists were using to agitate against British rule. It 
reveals that the two sides were deeply religious about their political positions, and 
would even go as far as to use religious bigotry in their arguments against their 
opponents. Crucially, however, it showed a clear political distinction between unionists 
and separatists.  
Salisbury frequently travelled round Britain, giving speeches and spouting his 
rhetoric on strengthening the unity of the union and empire. He was, however, 
completely trumped in his promotion of the Protestant defence of nation and empire by 
a member of his own party, Randolph Churchill, who announced in a letter to his 
friend Gerald Fitzgibbon that he was going to travel to Ulster in the north of Ireland, 
and appeal for the support of Irish protestants and the Orange Order by ‘play[ing] the 
orange card’.107 Churchill achieved this on 22 February 1886, when he made a famous 
speech at the Ulster Hall in Belfast, calling on Protestants to gripe against Home Rule 
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and furthered the notion that ‘the dissolution of the legislative Union between Great 
Britain and Ireland entails, at no distant day, the dissolution of the British Empire.’108 
Churchill’s speech was politically useful for the purposes of minimising the threat of 
Home Rule in the short term; however, it was highly dangerous as it agitated distinct 
divisions within Ireland itself, between Catholic and Protestant, between North and 
South. Yet, it demonstrated the lengths that certain political figures would go to in 
order to defeat Home Rule, but also to promote the ideal of keeping the country and the 
empire united.          
 By stirring Ulster Protestants against Home Rule, Churchill’s speech ironically 
showed how the language of one-empire conservatism also had the power to highlight 
and strengthen cultural divisions.  It was an extraordinarily powerful message among a 
large swath of the electorate, not just in Ulster and England, but also in other parts of 
the Union, particularly Scotland. Gladstone’s surprise transformation to the cause of 
Home Rule in 1886 had a considerable impression on the Scottish people, and how 
they perceived their position in the union and the empire. Scottish national identity in 
this period adopted a belief that being a member of the union and participating in the 
British Imperial project strengthened the ideals of Scottish nationhood. Associations 
were frequently made between Ireland and Scotland, the purpose being to emphasise 
the former’s failure to integrate and praising the latter’s success in doing so.109 The 
connection of the union to empire became a heavy part of the Scottish political culture 
during and after the 1880s. The nationalistic taint allowed the Scots to believe that they 
were a stronger nation as part of the union, and even go as far as influencing Britain’s 
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imperial ambitions.110 Scots were fully on board with the idealistic project of the one-
nation and one-empire simultaneously, with Conservatives and unionist Liberals 
incensed that Scotland was where they could go to make new political ground to argue 
for unionist and imperialist policies. With the nations of the union all investing so 
heavily in the ideals of one-nation and empire, it was highly unlikely that Gladstone 
support for Home Rule could be in line with the majority of the electorate’s opinions.
 The defeat of the second Home Rule Bill in 1886 guaranteed the collapse of the 
Liberal government, and campaigning for the general election began, campaigns in 
which Conservatives and Liberal Unionists took full advantage to make it a campaign 
largely based around positions relating to Irish Home Rule.  This offered the Tories 
and Liberal Unionists the opportune moment to fight the election based on who was 
the more patriotic party. With the national interests so heavily staked on British 
imperial survival, emotions typically ran high, and often debates turned into mud-
slinging matches. Gladstone went as far as to accuse Salisbury of being in favour of 
“asking for new repressive laws and to enforce them resolutely for twenty years.”111 
Salisbury and his unionist supporters merely brushed these criticisms to one side often 
declaring Gladstone’s ministry handling of the Home Rule affair as a “shipwreck”, 
which Gladstone and the Home Rule supporters “clung to what they termed the 
principle of the measure… one which threatened the ruin of the Empire.”112  
 In the end the combination of a Unionist split from the Liberal Party with 
Protestant, nationalist sentiment bolstered by the Conservative Party proved to be too 
much for Gladstone’s government. At the 1886 election, the Conservatives and Liberal 
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Unionists together took 51.4 per cent of the popular vote. In terms of seats, the 
Conservatives took 316, the Liberal-Unionists 78, the Liberals 191 and the Irish 
Nationalists 85 seats. Conservatives and Unionists combined, thus had a majority of 
118 over Gladstone’s party in conjunction with the Nationalists holding an 
overwhelming mandate against Home Rule.113     
 Gladstone was forced to resign in humiliation, his term in office had barely 
lasted a year. To make matters worse for Gladstone, he received a seething letter from 
Queen Victoria in response to the announcement of his resignation:  
 
His [Gladstone] assumption that the Home Rule vote in England returned the 
Conservatives at the last election and will now return his followers has not been 
borne out by results. Nor have the Liberal masses supported Mr. Gladstone’s 
policy in any marked manner, but have on the contrary apparently voted in 
large numbers in favour of maintaining the legislative union with Ireland. Mr. 
Gladstone will remember that she has expressed this opinion before. 
  The Queen is sorry that Mr. Gladstone repeats the cry against the 
wealthy and educated classes of the country, which does not appear to rest on 
any foundation.114 
 
Victoria had reserved a special loathing for Gladstone, which is plain for all to see in 
this letter, it also shows how Victoria was far from neutral in these matters and took the 
idea of the union and empire as seriously as Salisbury, Chamberlain, and in the end, 
the electorate.  A year later the nation celebrated Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee in 
1887, just ten years after she was hailed ‘Empress of India’ at the Imperial Assemblage 
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in Delhi. The country hailed Victoria as the maternal spirit of the British people at 
home and abroad, and as the personified symbol of their imperial greatness, with 
Victoria being more than happy to indulge in their feelings.115 The Home Rule Crisis 
was over, but only for a short time. With the Irish Nationalists still a persistent force in 
Parliament the issue was never likely to simply fizzle out. Further attempts for another 
Home Rule Bill were made under Gladstone in 1893, but they were defeated again, 
chiefly with the help of the House of Lords. Gladstone’s attempts for an amicable 
solution for Britain and Ireland seemed all but doomed. 
The electoral success for the Tories and the Liberal Unionists in the 1886 
election was not so much a victory for either of the parties. It was, in actual fact, a 
triumph for the idealistic principles of ‘one-nation’ and ‘one-empire’. The consensus 
across Parliament and the country in general was that these ideals had to be kept intact, 
and turned them into a sacred tradition that had to have the upmost protection. Irish 
Home Rule risked a disintegration of these proud perfectionistic principles, and had to 
be opposed at all costs. Gladstone and the Liberal Party’s stance on Home Rule placed 
them firmly in the firing line for being traitors to the one-nation and one-empire 
beliefs. The landslide victory of the unionist parties at the 1886 general election 
undoubtedly helped to confirm this. The politics of one-nation and one-empire that was 
used so effectively throughout the Home Rule Crisis would eventually be reinforced 
again. This time it would be at the turn of the century and involve Britain’s relationship 
with another of its territories.  	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Chapter III: The Second Boer War, the ‘Khaki’ Election, and the Vision of One-
Empire 
A Diamond Jubilee was held for Queen Victoria in 1897 for her service to the country 
by reigning as the British sovereign for sixty years of her life. Triumphant celebrations 
were held across the country, and central to the festivities was the ideal of Britain and 
its imperial strength and prowess. The march toward empire was seen as a greater 
progress with Victoria being a key symbol. The grandiloquence of imperialism that had 
been used to great effect by Disraeli, Chamberlain, and Salisbury, to name a few, 
became the domineering language of political debate around national issues. It is often 
noted how imperialism and patriotism went hand in hand, but British patriotism was, in 
fact, strengthened in the late nineteenth century because of the country’s rising 
imperial role.116         
 The British elite was provided a greater backing with the increasing presence of 
mass media. The media helped to inspire a new direction of ideological thought among 
Britain’s political elites and the general public. As the nineteenth century came to a 
close, the ‘popular’ and the ‘political’ press together were producing additional 
information about Britain’s colonies. With increased coverage came a change in 
attitudes towards Britain’s imperial dominions. Many journalists, esteemed editors, and 
successful newspaper owners of this period were enthusiasts for empire; with a 
disposition to link imperialism to British politics, which affected the ideas and 
supervision of some of the country’s most widely read and politically significant 
papers.117 Empire was a useful selling tool, with newspapers becoming prevailing 
weapons for circulating empire in the growing media, and endorsing the cause of 
imperial unity across the world. This, in turn, affected the day-to-day politics. 	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 Following the increase of the electorate under a series of Reform Acts, 
associations were set up by Britain’s major political parties, after 1867, in order to 
campaign for votes in subsequent elections. The Conservative Party were by far the 
most effective party at dealing with this form of electioneering, appealing to the 
aspirations of the working and middle classes, and presenting them with patriotic 
visions of Britain’s place in the world. This was especially true in the years of 
dominance under Salisbury in the 1890s, making it rather ironic that someone with an 
aristocratic background who possessed a special loathing for democracy led the party 
through a party of increasing electioneering.118     
 Moreover, Imperialism became a common aspect of Conservative propaganda 
through the form of letters, leaflets and posters, to name but a few examples. An 
everyday aspect of the Conservative Party’s propaganda was its use of patriotic, 
jingoistic language when it came to supporting Britain’s Empire, as we have seen with 
the events surrounding the Irish Home Rule crisis. It was especially the case, also, at 
times of war and other forms of conflict. This was insurmountably reinforced 
surrounding the events of the Second Boer War (1899-1902).   
 Britain’s most central commercial routes were through the Cape of Good Hope 
and the Suez Canal, and its imperial centre was India, the ‘Jewel in the Crown.’ 
International prestige needed to be defended and maintained no matter what, even if 
that meant acts of war. The South African war, therefore, was not some small local 
difficulty, but a war in defence of the empire, of both its present coherence and its 
future unity. Readman argues that the Second Boer War significantly impacted British 
politics and society. The Annual Register for 1900 noted, “the interest aroused by the 
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war, with all its side issues, was sufficient to occupy public interest to the exclusion of 
all other subjects.”119 Therefore, the events of the conflict will show how Britain’s 
imperialist politicians and parties used the arguments of ‘one-empire’ in order to 
increase its support base, and crush the Liberal party and the wider Liberal movement 
in Britain through electioneering and campaigning, with the strongest example of this 
being the general election of 1900, dubbed the ‘khaki’ election. The argument put 
forward by Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, time and again, was that if Britain lost 
its influence in South Africa, the empire itself would start to unravel, and, thus, Britain 
would lose its power and prestige.        
 This form of patriotism, created out of the reinforcement of one-empire, fixated 
on securing the pleasures relished at home by British subjects throughout the empire. It 
viewed the frontiers of the nation as being overseas, extending as far as the colonisers 
and their ideals went. These chauvinistic notions played incredibly well into the hands 
of the imperialists who denounced Liberals and others who criticised the war itself, and 
other British policies towards South Africa. 
      * 
Britain had experienced a tumultuous relationship with South Africa. The country’s 
policies with regard to Southern Africa had always been to maintain an influence in 
individual states and colonies such as the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and 
Bechuanaland. In the 1870s British officials had tried to unite all of South Africa into a 
confederation, however, this had very little success and the individual colonies were 
sceptical and spoke out. Afrikaners within the Transvaal soon began to stir up 
opposition to British rule. One in particular was Paul Kruger, who opposed the idea of 
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a confederation and increasing annexations under British regulation led the 
Afrikaners.120  
By 1886 Frederick and Henry William Struben discovered gold along the 
Witwatersrand, around thirty miles south of Pretoria. The discovery of precious 
materials such as gold and diamonds produced a profound effect on Southern Africa, 
moving the region’s economy from agricultural to industrial, and its society from rural 
to urban in a rapid space of time.121 As a result of the economic boom in the area, 
thousands of migrants swept into the cape to work in the mining industry, and make a 
living. As a result, certain hostilities began to emerge among the Afrikaners who were 
already living there, denouncing the thousands coming into South Africa, calling them 
‘Uitlanders’ as a form of discrimination. Devoted imperialists such as Joseph 
Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury were openly irritated at how Pretoria treated the 
Uitlanders who were living in the Transvaal as British subjects. It soon became a 
matter of secret British policy to try and counter Paul Kruger’s Afrikaner influence, 
even going as far as to use coup d’état-style tactics.      
 In late 1895, with the backing of Chamberlain, who at this point was Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, the unwavering imperialist Cecil Rhodes plotted the 
overthrow of the Transvaal government. The plan was to send an armed force, under 
the command of Dr. Leander Starr Jameson to capture Johannesburg and establish a 
provisional government under British rule. 122  There was little support from the 
Uitlander community at the time for such an act; however, Chamberlain continued with 
the plan regardless, and failed in what was a complete act of folly, providing Kruger 
and the Afrikaner movement with far more support than was initially the case. 
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Humiliated, the British knew that their influence over affairs in southern Africa was 
dwindling rapidly following the disastrous Jameson Raid. This was not to be the last of 
Britain’s attempts to reduce the influence of the Boer’s, however.   
 In 1899, a man called Mr. Edgar was shot dead in a fracas in South Africa by a 
drunken Boer police officer. This act of killing became significant due to the fact that 
Mr. Edgar was an Uitlander, triggering the cause of over 20,000 Uitlanders to sign a 
petition addressed to Queen Victoria, directly deploring the killing.123 In an attempt to 
whip up support against the Boers in Britain, Alfred Milner, 1st Viscount Milner (1854-
1925), a keen imperialist and stringent believer in theories of racialism, mobilised 
those who identified with the Uitlanders, and those who were sympathetic to their 
plight, to throng their requests, and quickly drummed up an alliance with some of the 
gold magnates in South Africa. Milner wrote to Chamberlain in May 1899 that:  
 
The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position 
of helots, constantly chiefly under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to 
Her Majesty’s Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence 
and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government 
within the Queen’s dominions.124  
 
It was thought that to re-establish British authority in Southern Africa would bolster its 
position among other great powers and would have great strategic value. 125 
Chamberlain was equally worried about the standing of the Uitlanders at the time. In a 
reply to Milner five days later, Chamberlain claimed that if the Uitlander community 	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was not declared equal with the Boer community it could cause unrest in the Transvaal, 
which in turn could weaken Britain’s Empire and its unity: 
 
This ordinary right of all Government is strengthened in the present case by the 
peculiar relations established by the conventions between this country and the 
Transvaal, and also by the fact that the peace and prosperity of the whole of 
South Africa including Her Majesty’s possessions, may be seriously affected by 
any circumstances which are calculated to produce discontent and unrest in the 
South African Republic… Her Majesty’s Government, however, attach much 
less importance to financial grievances that to those which affect the personal 
rights of the Uitlander community, and which place in a condition of political, 
educational and social inferiority to the Boer inhabitants of the Transvaal, and 
even endanger the security of their lives and property.126 
 
There was clearly a genuine concern for the Uitlanders, but Chamberlain and Milner’s 
letters show what it is about the situation in South Africa that particularly vexes them 
the most. The end of both correspondences reiterate that the greatest sin the Boers 
made was to defy the nation of Britain and the Queen’s empire with all its traditions, 
and by September, Chamberlain acted, demanding that Kruger allow full voting rights 
for the Uitlander populations. Refusal to do so would be to defy British rule, and could 
be met with action. Yet, Kruger was never likely to allow such a measure, especially if 
it meant risking Boer control over the South African Republic. Kruger, in retaliation, 
issued an ultimatum instead to the British in October, calling for them to withdraw 
their troops from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Kruger appeared to be 
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willing to initiate conflict if he needed to. In reality, however, Kruger was not looking 
for such a fight with The British Empire. Britain had control over the Cape, Natal, 
Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, all pressing upon the Boer republics’ frontiers, and the 
Uitlanders were merely a tiny minority within the Transvaal. Therefore, any such 
conflict was guaranteed to have severe ramifications. 127  Unfortunately with the 
ultimatum issued by Kruger, conflict, at the time, seemed unstoppable, and it became a 
reality soon after, with Britain declaring war in October 1899.    
 From the very beginning of the war, the interests outlined by the British were 
clear, with Conservatives and Liberal Unionists teaming up once again to protect 
British subjects abroad, defend Britain’s authority in its empire, and to strengthen the 
unity of that empire from those who wished to dismantle it. Leaflets began to be 
distributed by the Conservative Party to the electorate outlining their reasons for 
engaging in the war, with Salisbury, Chamberlain, Lord Selbourne and Arthur Balfour 
all contributing. Chamberlain made his case for the war on protecting the Uitlanders, 
but his tone, however, was far more imperialist claiming that the principles of the 
empire had to be upheld: 
 
We are going to war in defence of the principles upon which this Empire has 
been funded, and upon which alone it can exist. The first principle is this – that 
if we are to retain our position in regard to other nations, we are bound to show 
that we are both willing and able to protect British subjects everywhere when 
they are made to suffer from oppression and injustice. The second principle is 
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that, in the interests of South Africa, and in the interests of the British Empire, 
Great Britain must remain the paramount power in South Africa.128 
 
Chamberlain’s principled case smacked of the language of one-empire by emphasising 
consistently that British subjects were granted the same rights under the imperial 
umbrella. By discriminating against the Uitlanders, the Boers were directly challenging 
the authority and legitimacy of Britain’s Empire, which ultimately undermined the 
idealism that one-empire conservatism provided. Other dominions bought into this 
ideal as well, with strong support in the war effort coming from Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada, to name a few.       
 Following the march to War, on Oct. 30th, 1899, a Canadian contingent of 1000 
men from Quebec was sent to fight in the Boer War. Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Canadian 
Premier made an address outlining the imperial position and condemning those who 
opposed Britain’s position in South Africa as ‘Little Englanders’: 
 
It is inspiring to reflect that the cause for which you mean of Canada are going 
to fight is the cause of justice and the cause of humanity, of civil rights, and of 
religious liberty. This war is not a war of conquest or of subjugation. It is not 
to oppress a race whose courage we admire, but it is to put an end to 
oppression imposed on subjects of her majesty in South Africa by a tyrannical 
people. Its object is not to crush out Dutch nationality, but to establish, in a 
land over which Her Majesty is suzerain, British sovereign law to assure to all 
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men in that country an equal share of liberty… To cement the unity of the 
Empire… If you do your duty, your proud countrymen will share your glory.  
 
The Canadian Premier’s intervention is thoroughly revealing, and manages to sum up 
the entire British position on the matter. It was for the sake of protecting British 
authority and prestige in its dominions, and denouncing any force that acted against 
this as ‘tyrannical’. Moreover, the war allowed the Canadians and other dominions’ 
armies to participate fervently in the imperial project, especially when using phrases 
such as ‘the cause of humanity, of civil rights, and of religious liberty.’ Laurier goes 
on to declare: 
 
Fellow Countrymen, let it be known that we are at one with our loyal brethren across 
the sea; let there be no suspicion of agreement with the sentiments of the poor 
miserable Radical Little Englanders. At this critical time there is but one course to 
take, and that is to SUPPORT THE UNIONIST Government and to consolidate our 
glorious   Empire.129   
 
Noticeably, it became an aspect of political rhetoric at the time of the conflict to 
present the ideal of the ‘unity of empire,’ but it also became conventional for the 
Conservatives to brutally attack their Liberal opponents who remained divided on the 
issue, and had certain reservations about starting a conflict in South Africa. Phrases 
like ‘Radical’ and Little Englander,’ as used by Laurier, became common terms of 
abuse against those who differed from the conventional opinions of imperialism. It 
was easy for the Tories to take full advantage of the Liberal disarray by ‘splitting up 
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their opponents’ as Salisbury had achieved at the time of the Home Rule Crisis.130 
This time, however, the Conservatives had increasing levels of media coverage, party 
membership, and political propaganda, which were used more widely than ever before.  
The war had managed to damage the government under the Conservatives, but it 
had left the Liberals in a far worse position, dividing them into opposing fragments 
precisely because they could not produce a coherent message, like the ideal of one-
empire, that would appeal to all sides of the party, and, crucially, the electorate. The 
party split into rival factions, once again, between radicals, moderates, and 
imperialists, with their leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman being powerless to 
prevent it. It was the perfect time for the Tories to call for an election when the 
opposition was heavily divided, and before the war was over.131 The Tory government, 
on the other hand, had the choice to opt for a double solution: to affirm that the war 
could not lead to a compromise with the Boers, and claim that South Africa should 
become a series of annexed states, governed as Crown colonies. The position of the 
Liberal opposition was a problematic dilemma. Either be a fervent supporter of the 
British war effort in South Africa, or they would find it difficult to propose new 
solutions, or even move away from the topic of war without being labelled as ‘pro-
Boer’ or anti-British.132 
It was well known that an election would be looming at some point and 
prospective unionist Members of Parliament took full advantage over their Liberal 
counterparts. For instance, Geoffrey Drage, a Conservative Member of Parliament, 
made a speech in Derbyshire in December 1899, intended to highlight the weakness of 
the governing Liberal Party on the position of engagement in South Africa:   
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At a time like this, when our troops are fighting in the face of the enemy, it 
seems to me that all such questions should be dealt with from a national, and 
not from a party standpoint…It is true that the Queen is on the throne, but 
behind the throne stands each and everyone of you – thinking members of this 
great people. If you do not inform yourselves whether you Government is 
doing right or wrong, you cannot carry out your duty to the great and vast 
empire which has been handed down to you by generation after generation of 
able, hard-working, fighting men… My only interest in South Africa is the 
interest of this country, the commonwealth of the empire, and it is that interest 
and that interest only which dictates my actions in public life…  
                                  
Conventional party and local politics evidently became second rate to what was in the 
best interests of the one-nation and the empire. Drage even insinuates that empire is a 
tradition when he mentions it being handed down by previous generations, providing 
the empire with a particularly sacred zeal that should not be tampered with. He goes 
on to add:   
 
To my mind they [Liberals] are misguided, but I firmly believe that these 
men are as jealous of the honour of Great Britain and the honour of the 
Queen as you or I are… Now the cardinal mistake the Little Englanders 
make, where a quarrel between an Englishmen and a foreigner is concerned, 
is that they begin by assuming that their own countrymen is in the wrong… 
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By their speeches the Little Englanders led Mr. Kruger to believe that 
nothing would induce this democracy or the Crown to go to war.133 
 
This is just one of many speeches made by Conservative MPs and candidates 
highlighting aspects of Liberal weakness, and what they considered to be national 
values. It is interesting to note Drage’s reference to the Liberals believing that their 
fellow countrymen are wrong, giving the impression that the Liberals are against the 
best interests of the people. Again, the term ‘Little Englanders’ is used, even implying 
that those who are critical of the war were somehow willing to discard all of Britain’s 
achievements, which would only play to the advantage of Paul Kruger. Furthermore, 
Liberal Unionists were just as willing to use these tactics. Lord Rosebury, as a Liberal 
had no trouble in attacking other members of his own party as little Englanders, and 
made a speech condemning them as such:  
 
I believe that the party of a small England, of a shrunken England, of a 
degraded England, of a neutral England, of a submissive England, has 
died… WORKING MEN! The correspondence of Radical M.P.’s with the 
enemy, their speeches, actions, and votes show that alas! The party of a 
small England, of a shrunken England, of a degraded England IS NOT 
DEAD… But KILL IT NOW by your contempt, your loathing, your manly 
patriotism, and your votes FOR A UNITED EMPIRE.134 
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From theses quotations, Lord Rosebury had a clear understanding of the English mind 
on these matters, which was that a strong, united empire bolstered English identity. By 
mentioning the Crown, the Commonwealth, the nation, and the empire, Conservative 
Party members, and Liberal Unionists, were using all of their energies to put forward a 
patriotic, imperial message about sustaining the unity of empire above everything else. 
Not only that, but other organisations were being set up in partnership with the Tories 
in order to spread propaganda and provide legitimacy to the imperial cause. The 
National Union, the Central Conservative Office, the Imperial South African 
Association (ISAA), and even the Navy League were all connected for spreading the 
message of imperial unity, and the Boer War gave them the chance to pour out endless 
pamphlets. In effect, government propaganda became outsourced. With a blatant 
disrespect for facts and a high degree of emphasis on emotional appeal, they carried on 
from 1899 through to the general election of 1900, a concentrated campaign of rotten 
journalism to associate in the public mind the terms “Liberal,” “little Englander,” “pro-
Boer,” and “traitor.”135 Their press poured out tirades, assigning attacks against leading 
members of the Liberal party; and their leaflets became increasingly vicious as the 
general election of 1900 approached. The language being used against Liberals and 
Radicals was clearly a language of disgust, with an implication that those who 
questioned the war effort were harming imperial unity and being blasphemous. If 
Randolph Churchill had played the ‘Orange Card’ over Irish Home Rule, the unionist 
imperialists were now playing the imperial card over the Boer War. 
 The general election of 1900 soon came to be dubbed the ‘khaki election’; an 
election defined by a mud-coloured modern war, designed to for Tories and Liberal 
Unionists to brutally attack their opponents. Moreover, the tensions between Liberals 
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and their Conservative and Unionist counterparts were now creeping back into British 
political discourse, and cruelly attacking those who did not conform.   
 Journalists such as C.P. Scott for the Manchester Guardian had attacked the 
Conservative’s position on the war for attempting “to turn patriotic feeling to party 
purposes, to hide the shortcomings of politicians at home behind the hard-won 
successes of our soldiers abroad… and to ride into power for six years more on a vote 
taken amid the heat and excitement of a great conflict.”136 A pamphlet was issued 
anonymously, which Scott thought was most likely produced by the Conservatives, 
that spent its entire four pages campaigning against him, uniquely on his position on 
the war. Throughout the pamphlet Scott’s patriotism came under constant attack. For 
instance, the pamphlet purported that Scott failed to sympathise with the Uitlanders 
because they were merely Englishmen, and not the Boers, implying that Scott would 
rather see a South African victory in order to spite his own country. Scott was even 
accused of encouraging Kruger to resist British demands and agitate, a point that Scott 
rejected intensely.137         
 Liberal Britain was being overshadowed by patriotic triumphalism that 
appealed to tribal political instincts, which asserted that the sustaining of the one-
empire ideal undermined all other aspects of government policy. With all the 
backbiting politics and the lack of objective facts in favour of patriotic jingoism, it was 
only a matter of time before Tories and unionists began to draw comparisons between 
the debates over Home Rule in the 1880s and the current problems debating the Boer 
War at home. Joseph Chamberlain was one of the first to draw this comparison, and on 
29 June, Chamberlain spoke at the at the Annual Banquet of the National Union of 	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Conservative and Constitutional Associations in London and compared the cases of the 
Home Rule Crisis and the South African conflict:  
 
“We (the Unionist Party) were brought together by a common danger. How 
great that danger was we are only, perhaps, just now beginning to appreciate, 
when we reflect what our situation would have been to-day if we had a 
Parliament in Dublin, co-ordinate with our own, manned by the enemies of 
England. But I daresay that many of us on both sides thought at that time 
that our alliance was only temporary, and that it would naturally come to an 
end with the crisis which had brought it into existence… The fight for the 
Union, we can all see now, was only a chapter in the greater fight for the 
Empire… Those men who with a light heart would have brought about the 
disintegration of the United Kingdom are substantially the same men who 
did their utmost to prevent the expansion of the Empire. Those who would 
have thrown over their fellow subjects and co-religionists in Ulster are now 
ready to desert the loyalists in South Africa and the Uitlanders in the 
Transvaal…  
 
By echoing the past problems of the Home Rule Crisis, Chamberlain was drawing 
comparisons between the Irish Nationalists and the Boers who he considered to be the 
‘enemies of England.’ Moreover, Chamberlain points out that the Home Rule Crisis 
was a battle for the union and the empire. The Boer aggression was a direct attack on 
Britain and its empire’s legitimacy. Taking aim at radical Liberals, Chamberlain 
believed they were committing an act of treason and cowardice by allowing the 
Uitlanders to suffer at the rule of the Boers. Chamberlain went on to assert: 
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In this time Conservatives and Liberals, forgetting ancient animosities, 
laying aside personal prejudices which at the commencement of this great 
change were no doubt very strong, have worked together for the good of the 
Empire and for the material progress and welfare of the masses of the 
population in this country, especially of late… It is said now for the 
consumption of the electorate, that there is no difference between us, we are 
all patriots, and we are all Imperialists.138 
 
Chamberlain wished to present himself as someone who was willing to put aside party 
politics in favour of a language of one-empire when he suggests that ‘there is no 
difference between us’ reiterating the ideal of imperial unity under one authority, 
which the electorate willingly bought into when the election came around in July. The 
Liberal Party was annihilated at the polls. The majority of the British electorate was 
hardly going to vote in big numbers for a party that was hopelessly divided. Over a 
third of all constituencies were uncontested, and the overwhelming majority of these 
seats returned Unionists that took a strong principled stance on the war.139 The final 
result gave the Conservative and Liberal Unionists a combined total of 402 seats, 
whilst the Liberals could barely manage half of that, with a total of 183 seats. It was 
the case that Unionist candidates who declared themselves as patriots of the empire 
won seats, or defended them successfully, whilst Liberals and Radicals were pushed 
aside due to their party’s splits and its wider image of incompetent governance.  
 Even in Scotland the Liberals were in serious trouble. The Conservatives 
achieved their first ever majority there since 1832, a clear sign that Scots were 
beginning to detach themselves from the Liberal movement. The open objectivities 	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over the Boer War between the Liberal Imperialists who supported Britain’s role in the 
conflict, and the radical wing under Campbell-Bannerman, who strongly opposed it, 
had done untold damage to the party’s standing among the Scottish electorate who had 
a strong inclination to support British imperialism, as a means of strengthening a wider 
Scottish nationality and purpose.140 Overall, it appeared that the Liberal Party, with 
their intense dissections and squabbling over imperial matters, had lost the patriotic 
trust of not only the Scots, but also an overwhelming mass of the British electorate.  
 The Second Boer War was a profound turning point in British politics. Not only 
was it an incredibly costly war, in financial terms, loss of life, and Britain’s imperial 
reputation in Southern Africa, which was insurmountably damaged, by providing 
Kruger and the Boer movement with greater popularity, as a result of what the South 
Africans saw as British aggression. More importantly, however, the start of the war 
and the subsequent general election a year later confirmed that the ideal of one-empire 
conservatism still resonated among the British political elites and sections of the 
public. It was a strategy that the Conservative Party and Liberal Unionists passionately 
reinforced, leaving their Liberal and radical opponents hopelessly divided and facing 
open annihilation by the British electorate at the polls. It was even greater proof that 
the imperialist ideological concepts of one-nation and one-empire could be continually 
adjusted to suit the needs of present circumstances. Thereby, changing Britain’s 
political culture and the people’s national identity as a result.  
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Conclusion  
This thesis has attempted to provide an analysis of the way the concepts of ‘one-
nation’ and ‘one-empire’ came to play a prominent role in the national and imperial 
discourse in Britain. It has also endeavoured to demonstrate how political figures and 
political parties reinforced these concepts as a means of strengthening their authority in 
Britain’s imperial dominions, and achieving electoral success at home, by appealing to 
the patriotic elements of the British electorate that was ever increasing.  
The imperialist ideology that Britain created and engrained in India did not 
collapse after the Revolt of 1857, but merely shifted into a new archetype. The liberals 
and utilitarians designed an imperial mantra that emphasised the importance of Britain 
helping India achieve a higher stage of enlightenment. This mantra went through a 
reformation that halted the series of alterations the liberals had made to Indian society. 
Liberal imperialism moved from an ideology of sentimentalism to one of 
authoritarianism, illustrated by the ideas of James Fitzjames Stephen, who appealed for 
a form of governance in India that was highly pessimistic of human nature. Stephen 
stressed the need for morally strong authoritative leaders providing happiness and 
protection for the Indian people, but not to liberate them or grant them a progressive 
series of rights. Stephen’s ideas, surprisingly, were not undertaken by most liberals, but 
in fact, most conservatives.       
 After the 1857 Revolt, conservatives like Benjamin Disraeli took their chance 
to criticise the liberal reformers, and Disraeli was able to carry out his one-nation 
conservative ideals at home and abroad in India. He believed the Indian people were 
relatable to their British subjects, and could be united under loyalty to the Crown, 
amicably demonstrated with the Royal Tiles Act of 1876, pronouncing Queen Victoria 
the Empress of India, and the subsequent 1877 Imperial Assemblage in Delhi. The one-
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nation theory adapted itself to become a theory of one-empire. Furthermore, it was a 
successful strategy, as Britain managed to stave off further revolts and increase their 
authority and legitimacy under the symbolic influence of the Crown. It also 
precipitated a triumph of conservative politics over the progressively liberal imperial 
narrative that had occupied British politics for over a century.  
 Following on from these events, British politicians decided to implement the 
ideals of one-empire conservatism at home. With a large number of Irish Nationalists 
in Parliament, it soon became clear that a radical settlement would be necessary in 
order to stave off the threat to national and imperial unity. The Liberals under 
Gladstone decided opt in favour of Irish Home Rule, leading to a gaping split within 
the Liberal party itself. Liberal Unionists such as Joseph Chamberlain helped to lead a 
charge against proposals that could, as they saw it, lead to the break of the union and 
fragment Britain’s Empire. One-nation and one-empire were brought back into use and 
shaped the wider debate on the issue. The compromise across Parliament and the 
country was that these ideals had to be kept intact, and were turned into a sacred 
tradition that deserved the upmost protection. Irish Home Rule risked a disintegration 
of these proud perfectionistic principles, with the nation and the empire having to be 
opposed at all costs. The drum of support for holding these two beliefs together led to 
the crushing defeat of the Liberals at the 1886 election. The electoral victory was a 
triumph not just for Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, but a triumph for the one-
nation and one-empire ideals.        
 With the threat of Irish Home Rule removed, new risks to Britain’s imperial 
unity occurred. After the disastrous Jameson Raid in 1895, which was an attempted 
coup, to unite the states within South Africa under a British territorial rule, the Boer-
led Afrikaner movement began to become more popular and even oppress British 
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subjects working in the country who were discriminated against and called 
‘Uitlanders’. After an Uitlander was shot dead by a Boer in 1899, the campaign against 
the Boers became overwhelming, especially with the help of party propaganda and the 
media outlets that were growing larger at the turn of the century. Unionist candidates 
used arguments of emotion and aggression at the time of the 1900 general election. So 
aggressive, in fact, that the election came to be dubbed the ‘khaki’ election referring to 
the election muddy and dirty tactics. Liberals who had their doubts about the conflict 
were referred to as “Radicals,” “traitors,” and causing the disunity of empire. The 
concept of one-empire was redeployed into British politics by politicians and the media 
as a means of strengthening the imperial cause, and helped the Conservative and other 
unionist parties achieve electoral success.      
 By the time the election came around, the divided Liberals lost badly at the 
polls, which confirmed that, the ideal of one-empire conservatism was still possessed a 
remarkable potency for Conservatives and other unionists, which they applied 
mercilessly. It garnered huge support among the British political elites and sections of 
the public, displaying that Britain’s political culture was predominantly led in the 
direction that it was of paramount importance to favour maintaining the unity of 
empire, and crushing Liberal dissention.  
In an age of imperial unrest and increasing democracy, in order to stave off the 
threat of revolution, the British political chose to appeal to patriotic instincts, which 
provided Britain’s imperial identity with a sense of purpose, direction and destiny of 
uniting all imperial dominions under the umbrella power of the British state. This ideal 
of one-empire appealed to the conservative mind-set that gave importance to the 
authority and governance rather than a liberal, progressive series of rights over an 
extended period of time. Consequently, liberal imperialism collapsed, and liberal 
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alternatives of governance did not stand a chance in general elections against those 
who wished to attract the patriotic instincts of the electorate. The ideological narrative 
of one-nation and one-empire had a heavy influence on politicians, the media, other 
nations in the union, and other dominions in the empire. Ultimately, these concepts had 
the power to stimulate elections and government policy in the domestic and imperial 
sphere, shaping the political culture as a result.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
	  
72	  
72	  
Bibliography 
Primary Sources: 
‘Minute by the Hon'ble T. B. Macaulay, dated the 2nd February 1835’ 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_ed
ucation_1835.html (Accessed 21 July 2014). 
‘Imperial Assemblage Delhi, India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur 
F86/166, 1877 (By permission of the British Library). 
‘Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India 
(published by the Governor-General at Allahabad, November 1st, 1858)’. British 
Library. I/OR/L/PS/18/D154 
Reform Act, 1832. Parliamentary Archives HL/ PO/ PU/ 1/ 1832/ 2&3W4n147. 
Copyright © Parliamentary Archives (By permission of the British Library). 
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/takingliberties/staritems/111832reformactzoom.html 
(Accessed 17 September). 
From: Benjamin Disraeli To: Queen Victoria House of Commons [Thursday] 24 June 
1858 Original: RAC B1744 Publication History M&BIV 163-8, dated at the House of 
Commons 24 June 1858: LQVIII 293-4. In Benjamin Disraeli Letters: 1857-1859. 
Edited by Disraeli, B., Alexander, J., Gunn, W., Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated (2004). 
Memorandum by the Viceroy [on Queen Victoria’s assumption of title “Empress of 
India”] Lord Lytton, 11 May 1876. India Office Records and Private Papers. 
IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO33/19. (By permission of the British Library). 
The Times (London, England), Friday, Feb 18, 1876; pg.8; Issue 28555. (By 
Permission of the Times Digital Archive) (Accessed 20 October 2015). 
   
	  
73	  
73	  
The Radical Programme: with a preface by The Right Hon. J. Chamberlain, M.P. 
London: Chapman and Hall Limited (1885). 
MR. GLADSTONE’S PROPOSALS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND: 
Their Nature and Effect. ADDRESS delivered by W.Willis, Esq., Q.C., to the members 
of the Colchester and County Liberal Club, on Wednesday, April 21, 1886. 
8146.f.23.(3.) 1886. Courtesy of the British Library. 
‘Lord Salisbury on Mr. Gladstone’s Manifesto.’ The Western Daily Press, Bristol – 
Thursday 17 June 1886. Courtesy of the British Newspaper Archive.  
The Aberdeen Weekly Journal - Saturday, June 26, 1886. Courtesy of the British 
Newspaper Archive. 
‘The Unionist Record, 1895-1900: A Fighting Brief for Unionist Candidates and 
Speakers’ published by The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional 
Associations, St. Stephen’s Chambers, Westminster, S.W. British Library, 8139.ff.8. 
(1900), p. 142. 
Right Hon. J. Chamberlain, M.P., addressed to Sir Alfred Milner on May 10th, 1899: - 
“Mr. Chamberlain to High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner” Downing Street, May 
10th, 1899. published by The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional 
Associations, St. Stephen’s Chambers, Westminster, S.W. British Library 8139.ff.8. 
‘WHY THIS WAR?’ (C.C.O. – October, 1899. – No.90.’ in ‘National Union of 
Conservative Associations. Tracts and Leaflets, 1891-1902’. J/8139.dd. Courtesy of 
the British Library. 
 ‘The Transvaal War. The Patriotism of our colonies. Little Englanders put to shame’ 
N.U. – November, 1899. – No. 94. British Library 8139.dd. 
   
	  
74	  
74	  
Real Causes of the War, and some of the Elements of the Final Settlement. Speech by 
Mr. Drage, M.P., at the Drill Hall, Derby, 7th December, 1899. Published by the 
Imperial South African Association. Courtesy of the British Library 8139.dd. 
Unionist v. Radical Policy. A clear statement of which is best for the people. [N.U., 
July, 1900. – No. 96. 8139.dd. 
Secondary Sources: 
Beck, R.B., The History of South Africa. London: Greenwood Press (2002).  
Buckle, G.E., The Letters of Queen Victoria, Volume 7: 1886-1890. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2014).  
Bentley, M., Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in late-Victorian 
Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001).  
Bew, P., Ireland: the Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2007) 
Blake, R., Disraeli. New York: St. Martin’s Press (1967). 
Cain, P.J., ‘Character, ‘Ordered Liberty’, and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral 
Justification of Empire, 1870-1914’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Vol. 40, No.4 (2012), pp. 557-578 [e-journal] (Accessed 3 April 2015). 
Cannadine, D., Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2001). 
Cawood, I., The Liberal Unionist Party: A History. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. LTD 
(2012). 
Chambers, I., The Chamberlains, The Churchills and Ireland 1874-1922. New York: 
Cambria Press (2006). 
   
	  
75	  
75	  
Cohn, B.S., ‘Representing Authority in Victorian India’. The Invention of Tradition, 
Edited by Hobsbawm, E and Ranger, T., pp. 165-209. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1983). 
Darwin, J., The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-
1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009). 
Devine, T.M., The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000. London: Penguin Group (2000). 
Dirks, N.B., ‘The Policing of Tradition: Colonialism and Anthropology in Southern 
India’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 39, No.1 (1997), pp.182-212 
[e-journal] (Accessed 26th March 2015). 
Disraeli, B., Sybil: or The Two Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980). 
Disraeli, B., Tancred: or The New Crusade. London: R. Brimley Johnson (1904). 
Edwardes, M., British India 1772-1947: A Survey of the Nature and Effects of Alien 
Rule. London: Sidgwick and Jackson Limited (1967). 
Ferguson, N., Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Penguin 
Books Ltd (2004).  
Finlay, R., ‘National Identity, Union, and Empire, c.1850-1970’. Scotland and the 
British Empire. Edited by Mackenzie, J.M and Devine, T.M., pp. 280-316. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2011). 
Flavin, M., Benjamin Disraeli: The Novel as Political Discourse. Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press (2005). 
Galbraith, J.S., ‘The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War’, The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1952), pp. 111-126 [e-journal] (Accessed 24 March 2016). 
Garvin, J.L., The Life of Joseph Chamberlain: Volume Two 1885-1895. London: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited (1933). 
   
	  
76	  
76	  
Giliomee, H., The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town: Tafelberg 
Publishers Limited (2003). 
Gopal, S., British Policy in India 1858-1905. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1965). 
Green, E.H.H., The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of 
the British Conservative Party, 1880-1914. London: Routledge (1995). 
Hampton, M., ‘The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C.P. Scott, the 
“Manchester Guardian”, and the Boer War, 1899-1902’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 
44, No. 1 (2001), pp. 177-197 [e-journal] (Accessed 24 March 2016). 
Hibbert, C., Disraeli: A Personal History. London: Harper Perennial (2005). 
Hobbes, T., Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008). 
Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Empire 1875-1914. London: Abacus (1987). 
Howe, S., Empire: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002). 
Jahn, B., ‘Barbarian Thoughts: Imperialism in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill’ 
Review of International Studies, Vol.31, No.3 (2005), pp. 599-618 [e-journal] 
(Accessed 1 April 2015). 
Jenkins, T.A., Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism. Basingstoke: Macmillan (1996). 
Judd, D., The Boer War. St. Albans: Granada Publishing Limited (1977).  
Judd, D., Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain. Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press (1993). 
Kennedy, L. et al., Mapping the Great Irish Famine: A Survey of the Famine Decades. 
Dublin: Four Courts Press LTD (1999). 
Lahiri, N., ‘Commemorating and Remembering 1857: The Revolt in Delhi and its 
Afterlife’, World Archaeology, vol.35, No.1 (2003) pp.35-60 [e-journal] (Accessed 29 
June 2014). 
   
	  
77	  
77	  
Lawrence, J., ‘Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914’, The 
English Historical Review, Vol. 108, No. 428 (1993), pp. 629-652 [e-journal] 
(Accessed 22 November 2015). 
Lawrence, J., Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in 
England, 1867-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998). 
Levine, R.A., ‘Disraeli’s Tancred and “The Great Asian Mystery”, Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction, Vol.22, No.1 (1967), pp. 71-85 [e-journal] (Accessed 27 October 2014). 
Lubenow, W.C., ‘Irish Home Rule and the Social Basis of the Great Separation in the 
Liberal Party in 1886’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1985), pp. 125-142 [e-
journal] (Accessed 4 February 2016). 
Lubenow, W.C., Parliamentary Politics and the Home Rule Crisis: The British House 
of Commons in 1886. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1988). 
Machin, I., Disraeli. Harlow: Longman (1994). 
Mantena, K., ‘The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism’ Histoire@Politique. Politique, 
Culture, Société, No.11, Mai-Août (2010), pp. 1-25 [e-journal] (Accessed 4 March 
2015). 
Marsh, P.T., The Chamberlain Litany: Letters within a Governing Family from Empire 
to Appeasement. London: Haus Publishing Ltd (2010). 
Mehta, U.S., Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1999). 
Metcalf, T.R., Ideologies of the Raj. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998). 
Mill, J.S., ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ In On Liberty and Other 
Essays. Edited by Gray, J., pp. 205-447. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008). 
Murray, C., Victorian Narrative Technologies in the Middle East. New York: 
Routledge (2008). 
   
	  
78	  
78	  
Niranjana, T., ‘Translation, Colonialism and the Rise of the English’. In Rethinking 
English: Essays in Literature, Language, History. Edited by Joshi, S., pp. 124-145. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1991). 
O’Day, A., The English Face of Irish Nationalism: Parnellite Involvement in British 
Politics 1880-86. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd (1977). 
O’Day, A., Irish Home Rule, 1867-1921. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
(1998). 
Ó Grada, C., The Great Irish Famine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995). 
Pakenham, T., The Boer War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson (1979). 
Pearson, H., Dizzy: The Life and Nature of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. 
London: Penguin Books Ltd (2001). 
Porritt, A.G., ‘The Irish Home Rule Bill’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 
(1913), pp. 298-319 [e-journal] (Accessed 4 February 2016).  
Porter, B., The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004). 
Purdue, O., The Big House in the North of Ireland: Land, Power and Social Elites, 
1878-1960. Dublin: University College Dublin Press (2009). 
Ramsden, J., An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830. 
London: Harper Collins (1998). 
Readman, P., The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the 
General Election of 1900’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2001), pp. 107-
145 [e-journal] (Accessed 25 November 2015). 
Roberts, A., Salisbury: Victorian Titan. London: Faber and Faber Ltd (1999). 
Rubenstein, W.D., Britain’s Century: A Political and Social History 1815-1905 
London: Arnold (1998). 
   
	  
79	  
79	  
Sartori, A., ‘The British Empire and its Liberal Mission’ The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol.78, No.3 (2006), pp.623-642 [e-journal] (Accessed 10 February). 
Schama, S., A History of Britain: The Fate of Empire 1776-2000. London: BBC 
Worldwide Ltd (2002). 
Schwarz, D.R., ‘Disraeli’s Romanticism: Self-Fashioning in the Novels’. In The Self-
Fashioning of Disraeli 1818-1851. Edited by Raymond, C. and Smith, P., pp. 42-65. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998). 
Shannon, R., The Age of Salisbury, 1881-1902: Unionism and Empire. Harlow: 
Longman Group Limited (1996). 
Smith, K.J.M., James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1988). 
Smith, P., Disraeli: A Brief Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996). 
Stapleton J., ‘James Fitzjames Stephen: Liberalism, Patriotism, and English Liberty’ 
Victorian Studies, Vol.41, No.2 (1998), pp. 243-263 [e-journal] (Accessed 4 March 
2015). 
Stephen, J.F., Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Three Brief Essays. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press Ltd (1991). 
Stephens, H.W. & Brady, D.W., ‘The Parliamentary Parties and the Electoral Reforms 
of 1884-85 in Britain’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1976), pp. 491-510 
[e-journal] (Accessed 14 January 2016). 
Stokes, E., The English Utilitarians and India. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1959). 
Strachey, L., Queen Victoria. London: Chatto & Windus (1921). 
Sullivan, E.P., ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J.S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’ 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.44, No.4 (1983), pp.599-617 [e-journal] (Accessed 
12 February 2015). 
   
	  
80	  
80	  
Taylor, A.J.P., Essays in English History. Harmondsworth: Penguin (1976). 
Thompson, A.S., ‘The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial 
Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 
Twentieth-Century British Studies (1997), pp. 147-177 [e-journal] (Accessed 8 March 
2016).  
Thompson, A.S., Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics c.1880-1932. 
Harlow: Longman (2000). 
Trevithick, A., ‘Some Structural and Sequential Aspects of the British Imperial 
Assemblages at Delhi: 1877-1911’. Modern Asian Studies, vol.24, No.3 (1990), pp. 
561-578 [e-journal] (Accessed 21 November 2014). 
Tunick, M., ‘Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill’s Defense of British Rule in India’ 
The Review of Politics, Vol.68 (2006), pp. 586-611 [e-journal] (Accessed 1 April 
2015). 
Vincent, J., Disraeli. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1990). 
Weston, C.C., ‘Lord Salisbury: Conservative Political Leader and Preeminent 
Politician in Victorian England’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
Vol. 142, No. 1 (1998), pp. 74-80 [e-journal] (Accessed 20 January 2016). 
Weiner, M.J., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981).  
Wright, H.R.C., ‘Some Aspects of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal’, The Economic 
History Review, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1954), pp. 204-215 [e-journal] (Accessed 
26 January 2015). 	  
